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Process and Reconciliation: Integrating 
the Duty to Consult with Environmental 
Assessment
PROFESSOR NEIL CRAIK*
As the duty to consult Aboriginal peoples is operationalized within the frameworks of 
government decision making, the relevant agencies are increasingly turning to environmental 
assessment (EA) processes as one of the principal vehicles for carrying out those 
consultations. This article explores the practical and theoretical dimensions of using EA 
processes to implement the duty to consult and accommodate. The relationship between EA 
and the duty to consult has arisen in a number of cases and a clear picture is emerging of the 
steps that agencies conducting EAs must carry out in order to discharge their constitutional 
obligations to Aboriginal peoples. The article examines the implementation of the duty to 
consult through various stages of EA processes, identifying the EA practices that are best 
able to satisfy the legal requirements and the aspirations of the duty to consult, as well 
as to identify areas that are likely to present challenges moving forward. The article also 
considers a broader approach to EA that is more likely to contribute to the overarching goal of 
reconciliation, arguing that greater attention must be paid to the deliberative and justificatory 
qualities of EA.
Alors que le devoir de consulter les Premières Nations est intégré au cadre de la prise 
de décision des gouvernements, les organismes intervenants adoptent de plus en plus 
un processus d’évaluation environnementale (EE) comme l’un des principaux véhicules 
permettant de procéder à ces consultations. Cet article explore les dimensions pratiques et 
théoriques de l’utilisation d’un processus d’EE pour mettre en œuvre le devoir de consulter 
et respecter. La relation entre l’EE et le devoir de consulter s’est imposée dans un certain 
*  Associate Professor and Director of the School of Environment, Enterprise and 
Development, University of Waterloo. The author acknowledges the support of the Law 
Foundation of Ontario and the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada 
in the preparation of this article. Excellent research assistance was provided by Dana Decent 
(University of Waterloo).
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nombre de cas et les étapes que les organismes responsables des EE doivent suivre afin de 
s’acquitter de leurs obligations constitutionnelles envers les Premières Nations commencent 
à se préciser. L’article examine la mise en œuvre du devoir de consulter à travers les diverses 
étapes du processus d’EE, identifiant les pratiques d’EE les mieux susceptibles de satisfaire 
aux exigences juridiques et aux aspirations du devoir de consulter, identifiant également 
les secteurs susceptibles de poser problème à l’avenir. L’article considère également une 
plus large approche de l’EE qui sera mieux susceptible de contribuer à l’objectif principal 
de la réconciliation, proposant qu’il faudra porter une plus grande attention aux qualités 
délibératives et justificatives de l’EE.
AS THE DUTY TO CONSULT ABORIGINAL PEOPLES becomes operationalized 
within the frameworks of government decision making, the agencies responsible 
for operationalizing the duty are increasingly turning to environmental assessment 
(EA) processes as one of the principal vehicles for carrying out consultations. 
There is a pragmatic attractiveness to using EA processes to implement the duty 
to consult where the activity in question is subject to EA, since much of the 
information and analysis of the environmental effects of a proposed activity will 
be required to assess the impacts of that same activity on Aboriginal rights and 
interests. Integrating these processes is efficient because it minimizes the need for 
multiple consultations. In addition, since consultations in one sphere may impact 
the scope of the activity under consideration in the other sphere—for example, 
consultations within the EA may result in project modifications that would 
have implications for the duty to consult Aboriginal people—the processes of 
consultation under the duty to consult and in EA are, to some degree, inseparable. 
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The inextricability of these obligations does not, however, mean that the 
duty to consult and EA fit together with ease or without important implications 
for one another. Integrating the duty to consult with environment assessment 
requires careful consideration of the unique obligations owed to Aboriginal 
people and the constitutional nature of those obligations. This article explores the 
practical and theoretical dimensions of using EA processes to implement the duty 
to consult. On the practical side, while EA has been identified by governments 
as the preferred avenue by which the duty to consult ought to be implemented, 
there remain questions about the limits of EA to satisfy the duty to consult across 
its many variations. Since the Supreme Court of Canada’s trilogy of decisions in 
Haida Nation, Taku River, and Mikisew,1 the relationship between EA and the 
duty to consult has arisen in a number of cases and a clearer picture is emerging 
of the steps that agencies conducting EAs must carry out in order to discharge 
their constitutional obligations to Aboriginal peoples. 
The relationship between EA and the duty to consult goes beyond a 
functional connection. Both are processes of reconciliation. The central purpose 
of EA is the generation of harmony between the natural environment and 
development activities; such a process requires balancing competing social goals 
and contested values.2 With the duty to consult, the goal of reconciliation seeks 
to achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with 
the sovereignty of the Crown.”3 In practice, reconciliation in the Aboriginal law 
context requires balancing the rights and interests of Aboriginal groups with 
those of non-Aboriginals.4 
The common purpose of reconciliation leads to both processes sharing a 
similar structural form. Both are primarily procedural obligations and can be 
discharged through careful attention to process considerations, such as notice, 
meaningful participation, and reasoned justification of decisions. The assumption 
that underlies both EA and the duty to consult is that by requiring decision 
1. Haida Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 SCR 511 
[Haida]; Taku River Tlingit First Nation v British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), 
2004 SCC 74, [2004] 3 SCR 550 [Taku River]; Mikisew Cree First Nation v Canada 
(Minister of Canadian Heritage), 2005 SCC 69, [2005] 3 SCR 388 [Mikisew].
2. See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, 2012, SC 2012, c 19, s 52(4) [CEAA]; 
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 USC 4321 §101(a) (1969) [NEPA].
3. Behn v Moulton Contracting, 2013 SCC 26 at para 28, [2013] 2 SCR 227 [Behn].
4. Taku River, supra note 1 at para 42 (“the Crown is bound by its honour to balance societal 
and Aboriginal interests in making decisions that may affect Aboriginal claims”); Beckman v 
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53 at para 10, [2010] 2 SCR 103 [Beckman]. 
See also ibid at para 103, Deschamps J.
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makers to consider the impacts of an activity on the natural environment or on 
the rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples, those interests will be accounted 
for and reflected in the outcome of the decision, notwithstanding the absence of 
formal substantive obligations to arrive at a particular result within either process. 
However, EA obligations and the duty to consult go beyond process. Neither 
is ambivalent about the outcomes it produces. The substantive aspect of EA is 
captured by the commitment to avoid “significant adverse environmental effects” 
caused by projects and activities subject to EA and to promote sustainable 
development.5 The substantive aspect of Aboriginal consultation is expressed 
through the duty to accommodate, which is similarly defined as “taking steps 
to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize the effects of infringement.”6 The 
substantive goals of EA are achieved indirectly by requiring that significant 
impacts be identified and disclosed. Mitigation is encouraged, but the structure 
of EA is such that the government may ultimately decide that the benefits of a 
project outweigh its environmental risks.7 Accommodation, on the other hand, 
has, at least formally, a different structure owing to its constitutional nature. The 
Crown’s discretion to subordinate Aboriginal interests to competing public goals 
is more constrained, and in cases of infringement of established rights, is subject 
to a high threshold of justification.8
The principal aim of this article is to examine both the promise and limitations 
of using EA to implement the duties to consult and accommodate. At the heart 
of this inquiry is the extent to which careful attention to procedural requirements 
can bring about substantive ends.9 In particular, I consider the prospects of EA 
contributing to a “generative” process of constitutional redefinition,10 which is to 
ask: To what extent can EA help build shared understandings among Aboriginal 
peoples and the Crown with respect to the evolving constitutional “compact” 
between the non-Aboriginal population and Aboriginal peoples?11 
5. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
6. Haida, supra note 1 at para 47.
7. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4(2).
8. Brian Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 SCLR 
(2d) 433 at 436. 
9. A Dan Tarlock has performed a seminal exploration of the relationship between process and 
substance in environmental law. See A Dan Tarlock, “Is There a There in Environmental 
Law?” (2004) 19:2 J Land Use & Envtl L 213.
10. Slattery, supra note 8 at 440. Slattery notes that the SCC has attributed a generative role to 
section 35 of the Charter. The SCC references this function in Rio Tinto Alcan Inc v Carrier 
Sekani Tribal Council, 2010 SCC 43 at para 38, [2010] 2 SCR 650 [Rio Tinto].
11. Beckman, supra note 4 at paras 97-98.
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The approach is principally descriptive in nature, and is intended to provide 
legal guidance to those persons engaged in EA processes that are being called 
upon to satisfy the duty to consult. I also put forward a normative argument. 
Here, the central claim is that if EA is to successfully meet the underlying 
goal of reconciliation, then those engaged in EA processes must adopt an 
understanding of EA that recognizes that it is not simply a technical process of 
impact identification and assessment—it is also a process that has transformative 
potential. In effect, EA processes ought to be understood as having the potential 
for genuine deliberation. While the EA process does not dictate particular 
substantive outcomes, EA requirements do necessitate that the procedural 
conditions give rise to “meaningful” consultation and good faith, which I argue 
requires that the parties must be open to reconsidering their interests in light of 
the factual and normative information that emerges within the EA process. This 
is an objective that has to date been underappreciated by administrative officials 
and courts, but one that is integral to the duty to consult and accommodate. 
In effect, participation in, and justification of, decisions in light of mutually 
acceptable reasons provides greater opportunities for Aboriginal co-authorship 
of the policy decisions that affect their rights and interests, which in turn has the 
potential for both the Crown and Aboriginal groups to generate a set of shared 
normative expectations that lay at the heart of the notion of reconciliation.
The article proceeds in three parts. Part I considers the proceduralized nature 
of EA and the duty to consult. In this Part, I examine the parallels and divergences 
between the structures of EA and the duty to consult. In Part II, which forms the 
central focus of the article, I look more specifically at stages of the EA process and 
how the duty to consult is being implemented through EA, and how Canadian 
courts understand the interaction between these processes. The focus here is on 
identifying the EA practices that are best able to satisfy the legal requirements and 
the aspirations of the duty to consult, as well as to identify areas that are likely 
to present challenges moving forward. Finally, in Part III, I return to the theme 
of process and reconciliation, and more specifically to the prospects of process 
obligations to contribute to a renewed constitutional order.
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I. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
ASSESSMENT: THE TURN TO PROCESS 
A. THE DUTY TO CONSULT AND ACCOMMODATE 
The duty to consult as a distinct constitutional requirement was established in its 
present form by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in Haida12 and Taku River13 
and has been elaborated upon in three subsequent SCC decisions: Mikisew,14 Rio 
Tinto,15 and Beckman.16 The duty to consult arises out of the broader principle 
of the honour of Crown,17 which places a general duty on the Crown in their 
dealings with Aboriginal people to determine, recognize, and respect the rights 
of Aboriginal peoples.18 In the context of treaty negotiation and interpretation, 
the honour of Crown requires the avoidance of ‘sharp dealing’ and imposes an 
overarching obligation of fairness on the Crown in their dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples. The honour of the Crown has been invoked in support of the obligation 
of the Crown to consult Aboriginal peoples in the face of infringements of 
established Aboriginal rights, with consultation becoming a critical consideration 
in determining whether a government action that infringes an established 
Aboriginal right is justified.19 
In Haida Nation, the Court recognized that the honour of the Crown extends 
the duty to consult to circumstances where Aboriginal rights are claimed, but are 
yet to be proved. Allowing the Crown unfettered authority to undertake activities 
that may affect asserted but unproven claims could permit the Crown to adversely 
12. Supra note 1.
13. Supra note 1.
14. Supra note 1.
15. Supra note 10.
16. Supra note 4.
17. See Slattery, supra note 8. See also Thomas Isaac & Anthony Knox, “The Crown’s Duty to 
Consult Aboriginal People” (2003) 41:1 Alta L Rev 49.
18. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 25.
19. R v Sparrow, 1990 SCC 104 at 1114, [1990] 1 SCR 1075 [Sparrow].
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affect the subject matter of ongoing negotiation.20 In these circumstances, the 
honour of the Crown serves to protect these contingent rights.21 
In Mikisew, the question before the Court was whether a Crown activity 
that was contemplated under a historic treaty—in this case, the taking up of 
surrendered land for road purposes—was nevertheless subject to the duty to 
consult. In holding that a duty to consult existed in these circumstances, the 
Court maintains that the honour of the Crown does not come to an end once 
treaties are negotiated. In this instance, the Crown remained obligated to consult 
since its activities had potentially adverse effects on the rights secured under the 
treaty. To hold otherwise would undermine the goal of reconciliation, which is 
understood by the court as a continual process, not as a destination that is reached 
upon concluding a treaty. The SCC made this point clear in Haida Nation, when 
Chief Justice McLachlin noted: “Reconciliation is not a final legal remedy in the 
usual sense. Rather, it is a process flowing from rights guaranteed by s. 35(1) of 
the Constitution Act, 1982.”22
Because the nature and strength of the Aboriginal claim will vary and the 
degree of impact from the government action will be dependent on the particular 
context of the activity in question, these requirements give rise to a duty that 
varies in its content. The SCC has evoked the concept of a spectrum to illustrate 
how the content of the duty to consult varies:
At one end of the spectrum lie cases where the claim to title is weak, the Aboriginal 
right limited, or the potential infringement minor. In such cases the only duty on 
the Crown may be to give notice, disclose information, and discuss any issues raised 
in response to the notice.
At the other end of the spectrum lie cases where a strong prima facie case for the 
claim is established, the right and potential infringement is of high significance 
to the Aboriginal peoples, and the risk on non-compensable damage is high. In 
such cases deep consultation, aimed at finding a satisfactory interim solution, 
may be required. While precise requirements will vary with the circumstances, the 
consultation required at this stage may entail the opportunity to make submissions 
for consideration, formal participation in the decision-making process, and 
20. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 27.
21. Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 33. Chief Justice McLachlin writes: 
The duty to consult … derives from the need to protect Aboriginal interests while land and 
resource claims are ongoing or when the proposed action may impinge on a Aboriginal 
right. Absent this duty, Aboriginal groups seeking to protect their interests pending a final 
settlement would need to commence litigation and seek interlocutory injunctions to halt the 
threatening activity. 
22. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 32 [emphasis added].
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provision of written reasons to show that Aboriginal concerns were considered and 
to reveal the impact they had on the decision.23
The honour of the Crown not only demands adherence to procedural 
requirements, but it also imposes a duty to accommodate. This duty is triggered 
where the prima facie case for the Aboriginal claim is strong and the activity is 
likely to have “significant” adverse effects.24 While the trigger looks very much like 
the requirement for deep consultation noted above, the duty to accommodate is 
best understood as a distinct obligation in the sense that a duty to consult at the 
lower end of the spectrum may still yield an obligation to accommodate, and an 
obligation for deep consultation will not necessarily require accommodation.25 
The duty to accommodate reveals itself through consultation.26 As a result, any 
consultation, to be meaningful, must entertain the possibility of accommodation.27 
In Wii’litswx v British Columbia (Minister of Forests), the court found that “[a]
n assessment of whether consultation was meaningful inevitably leads to an 
examination of what accommodations were reached.”28 
The precise content of the duty to accommodate remains ill-defined.29 The 
SCC describes the duty as “taking steps to avoid irreparable harm or to minimize 
the effects of infringement.”30 In its guidelines, the Federal government notes, 
“[t]he primary goal of accommodation is to avoid, eliminate, or minimize the 
adverse impacts on potential or established Aboriginal or Treaty rights, and when 
this is not possible, to compensate the Aboriginal community for those adverse 
impacts.”31 While the duty to accommodate is structured as a substantive right, 
23. Ibid at paras 43-44.
24. Ibid at para 47.
25. See Ka’A’Gee Tu First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2012 FC 297 at para 122, [2015] 
2 CNLR 28 [KTFN] (“[t]he duty to accommodate is not a free-standing legal right”).
26. Haida Nation, supra note 1 at para 47; KTFN, supra note 25. In KTFN, the Court quoted 
Blanchard J’s duty to consult analysis, noting that “the extent and nature of accommodation, 
if any, can only be ascertained after meaningful consultation” (ibid at para 38).
27. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 54.
28. 2008 BCSC 1139 at para 179, [2008], 4 CNLR 315 [Wii’litswx].
29. Lorne Sossin, “The Duty to Consult and Accommodate: Procedural Justice as Aboriginal 
Rights” (2010) 23:1 Can J Admin L & Prac 93 at 107; Dwight Newman, Revisiting The Duty 
to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014) at 103-06.
30. Haida, supra note 1 at para 47. 
31. Consultation that excludes from the outset any form of accommodation would be 
meaningless. See Minister of the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern 
Development Canada, Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodation: Updated Guidelines 
for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult (Ottawa: Indigenous and Northern Affairs 
Canada, 2011) at 53 [Federal Guidelines].
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the judicial treatment of the duty has severely curtailed its substantive effect by 
characterizing the duty as being satisfied through negotiation and compromise, as 
opposed to through the determination of formal legal rights: “[A]ccommodation 
requires that Aboriginal concerns be balanced reasonably with the potential 
impact of the particular decision on those concerns and with competing societal 
concerns. Compromise is inherent to the reconciliation process.”32 It follows that 
the duty to accommodate in the context of unproven or undefined Aboriginal 
rights does not include a veto.33 The result is to conflate the substantive content 
of the duty to accommodate with a form of process obligation, a point alluded 
to by the SCC: “Where consultation is meaningful, there is no ultimate duty 
to reach agreement.”34 The SCC’s deference to government discretion in 
connection with this duty—the standard of review for determination of whether 
the duty to consult and accommodate has been fulfilled is reasonableness—is 
consonant with an understanding that these duties require political, as opposed 
to judicial, competencies.35
B. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
Environmental assessment has become a central pillar of the environmental 
regulatory system in Canada and, indeed, around the world.36 The logic of 
environment assessment is straightforward. Prior to making decisions that may 
have adverse impacts on the natural environment, decision makers should inform 
themselves of the potential environmental consequences of their decision, and 
should inform and consult other government agencies and the public.37 In order 
to bring this examination about, environmental assessment legislation prescribes 
32. Taku River, supra note 1 at para 2.
33. Haida, supra note 1 at para 48.
34. Taku River, supra note 1 at para 2.
35. Haida, supra note 1 at para 62.
36. Richard Morgan, “Environmental Impact Assessment: The State of the Art” (2012) 
30:1 Impact Assessment & Project Appraisal 5 at 5-6 (noting the globalized nature of 
EIA processes).
37. It is difficult to essentialize EA, and different decision makers may seek to impose a more 
rigorous and sustainably-oriented approach, emphasizing not only bio-physical harm 
mitigation, but also seeking positive contributions to environmental, social, and economic 
sustainability. See e.g. Robert Gibson, “Favouring the Higher Test: Contribution to 
Sustainability as the Central Criterion for Reviews and Decisions Under the Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Act” (2000) 10 J Envtl L & Prac 39 [Gibson, “Contribution to 
Sustainability”]. The discussion that follows focuses on the legislative and judicial approaches 
to EA processes in Canada, which have tended to emphasize harm mitigation. I return to the 
issue of a more expansive understanding of EA in Part III, below.
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a set of procedural requirements that determine the level of scrutiny to which a 
project will be subject, the scope and content of the assessment itself, and the 
degree of public engagement.38 The procedural orientation of environmental 
assessment is captured in Friends of Oldman River, where the SCC describes EA 
in the following terms:
Environmental impact assessment is, in its simplest form, a planning tool that is 
now generally regarded as an integral component of sound decision-making. … 
As a planning tool it has both an information-gathering and decision-making 
component which provide the decision-makers with an objective basis for granting 
or denying approval for a proposed development. … In short, environmental impact 
assessment is simply descriptive of a process of decision-making.39
The precise procedural requirements of EA are variable and responsive to 
the potential level of environmental harm, and can range from cursory reports 
prepared by proponents or authorizing agencies with little or no opportunities 
for direct consultation to hearings before independent tribunals who prepare 
recommendations for statutory decision makers. The underlying logic is to match 
the procedural requirements with the degree of environment risk posed.
As suggested by the SCC, EA is not a regulatory instrument in the sense 
that EA legislation does not require adherence to pre-determined environmental 
outcomes in the manner that traditional command-and-control regulations, such 
as emission standards, do.40 That said, EA processes are very clearly intended to 
influence outcomes, and in this regard EA legislation identifies substantive goals, 
such as the avoidance of significant environmental effects and the promotion 
of sustainable development.41 However, the environmental goals towards which 
EA is directed are identified in such broad terms that, on their own, they put 
very little constraint on government activity. Ultimately, even where an EA 
discloses significant environmental impacts, it remains open for the government 
to proceed with the activity in question. The Supreme Court of the United States 
38. Christopher Wood, Environmental Impact Assessment: A Comparative Review, 2nd ed 
(New York: Routlege, 2003); Jane Holder, Environmental Assessment: The Regulation of 
Decision Making (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 6; Bram Noble, Introduction to 
Environmental Impact Assessment: A Guide to Principles and Practice, 2nd ed (Don Mills, ON: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).
39. Friends of the Oldman River Society v Canada (Minister of Transport), [1992] 1 SCR 3 at 
para 103, 94 Alta LR (2d) 129 [Friends of Oldman River]. See also MiningWatch Canada v 
Canada (Fisheries and Oceans), 2010 SCC 2 at para 14, [2010] 1 SCR 6 [MiningWatch].
40. Richard Stewart, “A New Generation of Environmental Regulation” (2001) 29 Capital UL 
Rev 21 at 140-41 (describing EIA processes as a form of reflexive law).
41. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
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(USSC) captured the procedural dynamic of EA when it noted that the National 
Environmental Policy Act, which contains the US federal EA obligations, “merely 
prohibits uninformed—rather than unwise—agency action.”42 
It would be an oversimplification of EA, however, to view it in purely 
procedural terms. The premise behind EA is that informed and open attention 
to adverse environmental effects will result in environmentally benign decision 
making, as public officials will seek to adhere to the identified public purposes 
of EA legislation. Public participation, which is an essential part of EA, serves 
as both an informational tool, insofar as members of the public can identify 
environmental and social impacts, and an accountability tool. Decision makers 
are required to justify their decisions in light of the environmental impacts and 
in light of the specific concerns raised by members of the public. Despite the 
SCC’s characterization of EA as supplying an “objective basis” for decisions, 
which suggests a purely technical role, EA is understood by many commentators 
as having political and normative dimensions.43 The consultative nature of EA 
provides opportunity for agencies and the public to bring power and influence to 
bear on decisions, while the justificatory nature of EA requires that decisions be 
justified in light of substantive normative criteria. 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE TURN TO PROCESS
The key point of connection between the duty to consult and EA is the turn to 
process as the primary approach to addressing substantive goals, with parallels in 
both the structure of the process and the underlying justification for preferring 
procedural obligations. First, both the duty to consult and EA are primarily 
concerned with government decision making and involve public duties. For the 
duty to consult, the focus on government arises from the special relationship 
between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples. In some instances, the courts 
have characterized this relationship as a fiduciary duty, but more generally, the 
relationship is captured by the more flexible concept of the honour of the Crown.44 
The government’s relationship to the public in relation to the environment arises 
not from a special relationship, but from the status of the natural environment as 
42. Robertson v Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 US 332 at 351 (1989).
43. Serge Taylor, Making Bureaucracies Think: The Environmental Impact Statement Strategy of 
Administrative Reform (Stanford, Cal: Stanford University Press, 1984); Robert Bartlett 
& Priya Kurian, “The Theory of Environmental Impact Assessment: Implicit Models 
of Policy Making” (1999) 27:4 Pol’y & Pol 415; Neil Craik, The International Law of 
Environmental Impact Assessment: Process, Substance and Integration (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008).
44. See Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2002 SCC 79 at para 81, [2002] 4 SCR 245.
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a public good. As such, the courts have recognized that safeguarding the public 
interest in the environment is the responsibility of the Crown—giving rise, for 
example, to the right of the Crown to recover damages for pure environmental 
loss.45 While the Crown’s obligation regarding the environment does not formally 
constitute a trust, there is a trust-like dimension that draws parallels with the duty 
to consult.46 In both cases, the Crown is understood as the steward of resources, 
the benefit of which accrues to others. This in turn requires, as a minimum, that 
the Crown discharge its stewardship obligations in good faith. In both cases, 
because the responsibility resides with the Crown and not a private party, such 
as a resource developer, the obligations relate to the Crown’s conduct and are 
triggered by the actions of the Crown.47 
Since both EA and the duty to consult engage administrative discretion, the 
Crown is required to exercise that discretion with reference to public values.48 
In relation to EA, these values are expressed in EA legislation and relate to 
public goals of sustainability, environmental protection, and meaningful public 
engagement.49 The public goals of the duty to consult are the recognition and 
accommodation of Aboriginal rights, which is framed as a public value through 
the honour of the Crown. In both cases, however, these underlying substantive 
goals are open-textured and only cognizable with reference to specific contexts. 
One might suppose that EA processes would become redundant in the 
face of specific standards governing air and water pollution, toxic substances, 
waste management, biological diversity, and endangered species protection, as 
well as land use controls.50 However, EA laws persist in the face of substantive 
environmental law. One reason why EAs have not become superfluous in the face 
of growing substantive environmental rules is that the avoidance of significant 
environmental harm, particularly from large and complex undertakings, is 
difficult to determine in the abstract. For example, most EA legislation recognizes 
the importance of cumulative impacts from multiple sources, something for 
45. British Columbia v Canadian Forest Products Ltd, 2004 SCC 38 at paras 72-83, [2004] 2 
SCR 74 [Canfor].
46. Ibid. But note that the Court in Canfor does not go so far as to hold that the Crown can be 
held legally responsible for breach of trust in the event of government failure to protect the 
environment (ibid at paras 81-82).
47. CEAA, supra note 2, s 5 (listing “triggers”).
48. Roncarelli v Duplessis, [1959] SCR 121, 16 DLR (2d) 689.
49. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
50. Michael Herz, “Parallel Universes: NEPA Lessons for the New Property” (1993) 93:7 Colum 
L Rev 1668 at 1682-83. Herz notes that under NEPA, there is an important separation 
between the presence of substantive standards and EIS commitments. 
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which it is difficult to develop standards.51 Ecosystem and related social impacts 
are often the result of the interaction of environmental and social components, 
which again requires a more holistic approach. Adherence to standards also 
does not adequately inform decision makers whether the social and economic 
trade-offs associated with an activity are justifiable—a determination that is again 
highly context specific. 
The need for contextual decision making is also integral to government 
decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. The particular circumstances relating 
to the strength of the claim and the potential for infringement will vary on a 
case-by-case basis. So too will the government’s interests in the potentially 
harmful activity.52 A set of clear substantive rules respecting accommodation is 
not possible because the duties to consult and accommodate necessarily respond 
to the particular facts at hand. The relationship between the duties to consult and 
accommodate is further complicated by the fact that the presence of a substantive 
duty cannot be determined ex ante, since part of the purpose of the duty to 
consult is explore whether there is a duty to accommodate. As currently described 
by the courts, the duty to accommodate has a kind of twilight existence. It does 
not give rise, at least in a formal sense, to a right of consent.53 But adherence 
to procedural duties alone will not satisfy the duty to accommodate, which 
requires, by definition, efforts to address Aboriginal concerns.54 Like the decision 
that must be made in EA, the duty to accommodate requires a balancing of 
competing interests.55 
Proceduralization is a product of the need for contextual decision making, 
but it is also recognition of the political content of the underlying goals.56 Since 
the decisions being undertaken involve the balancing of different interests that 
are traditionally left to the political branches of government, the recourse to 
procedure structures the nature of these interactions but not the content of the 
51. This is because standards tend to be facility-specific.
52. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 63.
53. Ibid. For discussions on obligations of the Crown where Aboriginal title is demonstrated 
on proven claims, see Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia, 2014 SCC 44 at para 76, 
[2014] 2 SCR 257.
54. Haida, supra note 1 at para 49.
55. Ibid. In Haida the Court noted that “the Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns 
reasonably with the potential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and with 
other societal interests” (at para 50).
56. See Gunther Teubner, “How The Law Thinks: Toward A Constructivist Epistemology Of 
Law” (1989) 23:5 Law & Soc’y Rev 727.
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outcome.57 Accommodation is a process of “balance and compromise” between 
Aboriginal groups and the Crown. Reconciliation, which, as mentioned, is the 
underlying goal of the duty to consult and accommodate, ought to be a product 
of negotiation rather than litigation.58 The turn to procedure respects the primacy 
of the political branches in the reconciliation process. 
Acknowledgement of the political nature of the decision-making process 
is also evident within EA processes. The decision to proceed with an activity 
is left to the discretion of the responsible agency, which must account for the 
results of the EA, but is not bound by it. While substantive norms shape the 
political process by creating burdens of justification on government decision 
makers, agencies retain control over the exercise of this discretion.59 Process does 
not serve to take politics out of the decision-making process, but rather requires 
that the government engage in a form of decision making that is transparent, 
participatory, and justificatory.60
Both sets of obligations blur the distinction between process and substance 
by imposing an informal substantive legal rationality on the decision-making 
process. The principles that guide the exercise of authority are substantive in 
the sense that they are intended to influence the outcome of the decisions. 
EA processes are, for example, meant to result in the avoidance of adverse 
environmental impacts. Decisions that engage the duty to consult are intended 
to lead to the avoidance of adverse impacts to those interests. The substantive 
obligations, owing to their inchoate and contextual nature, find expression in 
the commitment to principled decision making through the requirement for 
justification in light of shared substantive values. The standard of review of the 
adequacy of this justification is reasonableness, which recognizes the superior 
position of the original decision maker to assess the application of principles 
57. David Dyzenhaus & Evan Fox-Decent, “Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: 
Baker v Canada” (2001) 51:3 UTLJ 193 at 214.
58. Haida, supra note 1. Consultation “seeks to further an ongoing process of reconciliation by 
articulating a preference for remedies ‘that promote ongoing negotiations’” (ibid at para 14). 
See Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 38. See also Beckman, supra note 4. Justice Deschamps 
makes this point, noting that the “objective of reconciliation of course presupposes active 
participation by Aboriginal peoples in the negotiation of treaties, as opposed to a necessarily 
more passive role and an antagonistic attitude in the context of constitutional litigation” 
(ibid at para 103).
59. The identity of decision makers varies from system to system, ranging from individual 
administrative delegates to cabinet level decision makers.
60. Craik, supra note 43 at 280.
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to the often-complex factual context.61 While not subject to strict judicial 
supervision, normative justification is nonetheless constraining in that it reduces 
the available courses of action open to the government. The public nature of the 
justification contributes to the substantive constraints because the acceptance or 
non-acceptance of the reasons put forward can contribute to the government’s 
ultimate political authority on the respective claim.62
There is a strong emphasis on good faith within both processes. Good faith 
does not require that the government abandon its own interests in favour of those 
potentially affected by its decisions, but it does require a demonstration that the 
government make a genuine attempt to understand the interests of other parties 
and to assure those parties that their views have been accounted for. While good 
faith is largely determined with reference to how decisions were undertaken, 
there is also a substantive element that requires reasons to be given in order to 
demonstrate that the decision was made in accordance with the objectives of the 
respective obligations. 
The turn to process also reflects a more sociological understanding of how 
process obligations may influence substantive outcomes. Both EA and the duty 
to consult would appear to embrace the possibility that adherence to procedural 
requirements will result in social learning by the participants with the potential to 
internalize shared norms.63 By creating conditions that make genuine deliberation 
possible, participants may reconsider their interests in light of factual and normative 
information. EA was developed in part as a response to the failure of public 
agencies to consider environmental matters in the exercise of their discretion.64 
EA underscored the idea that environmental considerations ought to form a part 
of all good public decision making. Similarly, the duty to consult responded to 
the failure of the Crown and the courts (in injunction proceedings) to properly 
account for Aboriginal interests in government decisions.65 Internalization of 
norms is not guaranteed, and the supposed transformational effects of process are 
61. Haida, supra note 1. See also Sossin, supra note 29.
62. Dyzenhaus & Fox-Decent, supra note 57.
63. See e.g. John Sinclair & Alan Diduck, “Public Involvement in EA in Canada: A 
Transformative Learning Perspective” (2001) 21:2 Envtl Impact Assessment Rev 113; Robert 
Bartlett, “Rationality and the Logic of the National Environmental Policy Act” (1986) 8 
Envtl Professional 105 at 109-10 [Bartlett, “Environmental Policy Act”].
64. Lynton Caldwell, “Beyond NEPA: Future Significance of the National Environmental Policy 
Act” (1998) 22:1 Harv Envtl L Rev 203 at 208.
65. R v Van der Peet, [1996] 2 SCR 507 at para 31, [1996] SCJ No 77; Delgamuukw v British 
Columbia, [1997] 3 SCR 1010 at para 186, [1997] SCJ No 108. 
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the subject of criticism in both EA and the duty to consult.66 Nonetheless, the 
stated goal of both processes remains one of integrating competing sets of values 
into a shared vision, best captured in the concept of sustainable development that 
underlies EA and in Justice Binnie’s description of reconciliation as leading to “a 
mutually respectful long-term relationship.”67
Despite these similarities, there are also important differences in the 
nature of these obligations. The environmental interests that EA addresses are 
the interests that all citizens share in relation to the natural environment. EA 
originated in part as an acknowledgement that all citizens have an interest in 
maintaining environmental resources.68 Because these interests are shared, they 
are what I would classify as “stakeholder” interests, and are subsumed as part 
of the broader public interest.69 As a consequence, the interests protected are 
not superior to other elements of public interest, and may be traded-off against 
other public priorities, including development interests. In recognition of the 
government’s superior position in determining the public interest, courts have 
granted agencies implementing EA rules broad discretion to determine how best 
to balance competing interests.
The interests protected by the duty to consult are of a different character. 
The difficulty is that the character is variable depending upon the strength of 
claim. At the high end, where the interests are either proven rights or rights that 
possess high prima facie strength, the rights cannot be easily traded off. Given 
their constitutional nature, they are in effect superior to other public interests. 
This does not make those rights absolute, but it does require compelling and 
substantive reasons to justify infringement.70 Even in cases where the strength 
of claim is lower, the interests remain underlain by the potential existence of 
a future, proven right. The potential and underlying substantive content that 
attaches to Aboriginal interests is significant across the entire spectrum of the 
duty to consult because it is through the duty to consult that the nature of the 
interests reveals itself. As a result, the process always operates in the shadow of 
substantive Aboriginal rights. 
Unlike environmental interests, Aboriginal rights, which are held collectively 
by an identifiable group, are defined in opposition to the “broader community 
66. Joseph Sax, “The (Unhappy) Truth about NEPA” (1973) 26:2 Okla L Rev 239 [Sax, 
“NEPA”]; Newman, supra note 29 at 105.
67. Beckman, supra note 4 at para 10, Binnie J; NEPA, supra note 2, s 101 (“goal of 
sustainability”).
68. NEPA, supra note 2, s 101.
69. Canfor, supra note 45 at para 155.
70. Sparrow, supra note 19 at 1113.
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as a whole.”71 Whereas environmental interests can be entirely subordinated to 
other public interests, such as economic development, Aboriginal rights, which 
are constitutionally protected and independent of Crown authority, cannot 
be so easily subordinated. Since the duty to consult is oriented towards the 
reconciliation of “prior Aboriginal occupation of the land with the reality of 
Canadian sovereignty,”72 the Crown must temper the exercise of its sovereignty 
with the rights of self-determination and cultural self-expression that inhere in 
the fact of prior occupation. 
II. IMPLEMENTING THE DUTY TO CONSULT THROUGH 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
A. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EA AND THE DUTY TO 
CONSULT
The question of whether the Crown could implement the duty to consult through 
its existing EA processes arose in Taku River,73 a case that the SCC decided in 
2004 along with Haida.74 The case concerned a proposal to build a road through 
the Taku River Tlingit First Nation’s (TRTFN) traditional lands. TRTFN had 
participated in an environmental assessment process for the road under British 
Columbia’s Environmental Assessment Act.75 The SCC found that TRTFN was 
entitled to consultation in the middle to high range of the spectrum: “TRTFN 
was entitled to something significantly deeper than minimum consultation 
under the circumstances, and to a level of responsiveness to its concerns that can 
be characterized as accommodation.”76 
Under the process in place in British Columbia at the time, the EA process 
was coordinated through a Project Committee. TRTFN participated in the 
Committee process. It had an opportunity to review the many reports and 
studies produced in support of the project and was able to voice its concerns with 
the project as proposed. Ultimately, the project was recommended for approval, 
although TRTFN had outstanding concerns. TRTFN appealed the decision on 
the basis that the EA process was an inadequate form of consultation. The SCC 
71. R v Gladstone, [1996] 2 SCR 723, [1996] SCJ No 79 at para 73 [Gladstone].
72. Haida, supra note 1 at para 26.
73. Supra note 1.
74. Supra note 1.
75. Environmental Assessment Act, SBC 2002, c 43, s 29.1.
76. Taku River, supra note 1 at para 32.
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found that the EA process fulfilled the requirements of the duty to consult in 
this instance.77
The principal legal finding of the Court was that the duty to consult does 
not require the development of special consultation measures, but rather can 
be satisfied through existing schemes, such as the EA process.78 In coming to 
this conclusion, the SCC was careful to review in considerable detail the specific 
elements of the scheme. Given the variability of the duty to consult and EA 
processes, courts will be required to look behind the particular scheme to ensure 
that its application meets the requirements of the level of consultation that must 
be afforded in the circumstances. In this case, while the duty was determined to 
be near the high end of the spectrum, the particulars of the EA scheme satisfied 
that onus. The following features of the EA scheme were salient in this regard: (1) 
TRTFN participated directly as a member of the Project Committee (a statutory 
requirement);79 (2) several time extensions were granted to allow TRTFN more 
time to respond to information;80 (3) TRTFN was given financial assistance 
to facilitate its participation;81 (4) government officials and the consultants 
who prepared the EA held numerous meetings with the TRTFN to discuss its 
concerns;82 (5) TRTFN’s concerns were set out and “meaningfully discussed” 
in the Project Report;83 (6) the Project Report included mitigation strategies 
to address TRTFN’s concerns, and these strategies were incorporated into the 
project approval conditions;84 and (7) the permitting process for the project 
provided further opportunities for TRTFN’s concerns to be addressed.85
Matching the requirements of the duty to consult with the EA process, 
the key elements of the EA process were that: (1) TRTFN was provided with 
notice and full disclosure of the project details and impacts; and (2) TRTFN was 
given ample opportunity to understand how their interests were affected and to 
voice their concerns and have those concerns responded to meaningfully. The 
presence of mitigation measures that sought to address TRTFN’s concerns was 
understood by the Court as a form of accommodation.86 The SCC noted that 
77. Ibid at paras 22, 40.
78. Ibid at para 40.
79. Ibid at para 3.
80. Ibid at para 11.
81. Ibid at para 37.
82. Ibid at para 38.
83. Ibid at para 41.
84. Ibid at para 44.
85. Ibid at para 46.
86. Ibid at para 44.
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the EA process itself was adapted to meet the concerns of TRTFN.87 Taku River 
should be understood to stand for the proposition that the duty to consult may 
be implemented through EA in principle, but each case will be determined on 
its own merits in light of the particulars of the actual process carried out and 
the level of consultation and accommodation demanded in the circumstances. It 
should also be noted that the British Columbia EA process in place at the time 
that Taku River was decided provided for a high level of engagement that is not 
present in other jurisdictions, and has since been amended.88
The issue of EAs was also raised incidentally in Haida, where the SCC 
in its discussion of the duty on third parties (particularly project proponents) 
indicated that while the duty to consult cannot itself be delegated, the “Crown 
may delegate procedural aspects of consultation to industry proponents seeking 
a particular development; this is not infrequently done in environmental 
assessments.”89 The distinction that the SCC is making between “procedural” 
and non-procedural aspects of consultation is not entirely clear, particularly in 
light of the process-oriented nature of the duty as a whole. However, if viewed 
in light of Taku River, the EA process provides for a delegation to industry 
proponents of the conduct of the study, subject to defined terms of reference. 
During this process it is not uncommon for the proponent, typically through a 
consultant, to engage the public and other agencies in defining the scope of the 
study, identify public concerns, and, where appropriate, recommend mitigation 
measures to address those concerns. At the end of this process, the findings are 
communicated (usually in a report) to the statutory decision maker. In Taku 
River, the recommendations were made to the Executive Director of the EA 
division, who then made a recommendation to the Minister. As a result, the 
Crown, through the Minister, was ultimately responsible for the approval, and 
the Minister had a full record of the concerns of TRTFN and the measures of 
how they were addressed.
The issue of the adequacy of EA has arisen in subsequent cases. In Ka’A’Gee 
Tu First Nation v Canada, the adequacy of regulatory processes, including the 
EA process, was contested by the KTFN.90 In its decision, the Federal Court 
confirmed that EA processes could satisfy the duty to consult, but that process 
must provide meaningful consultation throughout the approvals process. 
87. Ibid at para 2.
88. Environmental Assessment Act, supra note 75. Taku River considers the process under the prior 
Environmental Assessment Act, RSBC 1996, c 199. See Taku River, supra note 1.
89. Haida, supra note 1 at para 53.
90. KTFN, supra note 25 at para 30.
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At issue in the case was a modification to the project that occurred after the 
consultation with the KTFN. While the process on the original proposal was 
the subject of adequate consultation, the Crown could not unilaterally modify 
the project without providing KTFN a further opportunity to have input on the 
modified activity.91 The process undertaken was in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, which did not require further consultation on modifications, but 
the Federal Court found the process failed to satisfy the duty to consult, noting 
that it is not enough to rely on a statutory process. The Crown’s constitutional 
duty must take precedence. In the Federal Court’s words, “the Crown’s duty to 
consult cannot be boxed in by legislation.”92 
A judicial consensus is emerging that statutory processes designed to satisfy 
other regulatory requirements, such as EA, may satisfy the duty to consult, so 
long as “in substance an appropriate level of consultation is provided.”93 In cases 
where the statutory process on its own is adequate, Aboriginal groups cannot 
insist on a separate and discrete consultation process with the Crown.94 In one 
case, the Federal Court went so far as to say that where statutory processes are 
accessible and adequate, Aboriginal groups have a “responsibility to use them.”95 
This is more likely to occur at the low end of the consultation spectrum. Where 
consultation requirements are more onerous, as in Taku River and Ka’A’Gee Tu 
First Nation, the statutory processes may need to be adjusted or supplemented 
in order to meet the constitutional requirements.96 This is not an insignificant 
challenge, as there are high degrees of variability in what the duty to consult 
will require in each instance, and in the manner by which the EA is structured 
alongside other regulatory approval processes.
One further aspect of the relationship between the duty to consult and 
EA is that even where an alternative consultation process is contemplated, the 
Crown may nevertheless have an obligation to ensure that there is adequate 
consultation within the EA. In Nlaka’pamex Nation Tribal Council v British 
Columbia, the statutory process for determining the terms of reference for an EA 
91. Ibid at paras 120, 124.
92. Ka’a’Gee Tu First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 763 at para 121, [2007] 
FCJ No 1006 [KTFN, 2007].
93. Beckman, supra note 4 at para 39. See also Conseil des innus de Ekuanitshit v Canada 
(Procureur général), 2013 FC 418 at 113, [2013] FCJ No 466 [Innu] (“[I]t is now a well 
accepted practice that Crown consultation can take place through CEAA’s EA process”).
94. Brokenhead Ojibway First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2009 FC 484 at para 42, 
[2009] FCJ No 608 [Brokenhead].
95. Ibid.
96. Taku River, supra note 1; KTFN, supra note 25 at para 112.
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process, including which groups had to be consulted as part of the EA process, 
excluded the Nlaka’pamex Nation Tribal Council (NNTC).97 The Environmental 
Assessment Office did propose consultations outside of the EA process, but the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal (BCCA) held that “[d]enying the NNTC 
a role within the assessment process is denying it access to an important part 
of the high-level planning process,” and as such, consultation outside the EA 
process could not be a “substitute for consultations within the assessment process 
itself.”98 The Crown had argued that in the circumstances, the proposed form 
of consultation was most efficient and that it was simply seeking to “balance 
its obligation to consult with its obligation to carry out its statutory duty in 
an effective manner.”99 As in other cases, however, the SCC recognized that the 
constitutional duty took priority and that efficiency rationales could not be used 
to compromise the duty to consult. 
This decision points to the inseparability of EA from the duty to consult. The 
SCC recognized that key aspects of the project would be determined through 
the EA process, and that consultations could not be meaningful because they 
were separated from that process and therefore from the broader decision-making 
process that could affect Aboriginal rights. The practical implication of the NNTC 
decision is that even where the Crown is engaged in parallel consultations, it 
must consider whether other regulatory processes may influence Aboriginal 
rights, in which case the Crown is likely obligated to provide appropriate levels 
of consultation within those regulatory processes.
This implication may also work the other way: Where Aboriginal 
consultations result in major project changes, the revised project may need to 
be the object of additional public participation through the EA process. Because 
the Crown must balance its obligations to Aboriginal peoples with other public 
interest concerns, it may face restrictions in its ability to consult with Aboriginal 
groups to the exclusion of other interested parties. These latter interests may 
trigger administrative law protections, but in the EA context they are most likely 
addressed through statutory public participation requirements.
B. CURRENT GOVERNMENT PRACTICES
The federal and provincial governments have indicated a clear preference 
to use EA processes where they apply to fulfill the duty to consult, and have 
97. Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal Council v British Columbia, 2011 BCCA 78, 198 ACWS 
(3d) 886 [NNTC].
98. Ibid at para 97.
99. Ibid at para 68.
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increasingly institutionalized their approach in government policy. For example, 
the federal government’s guide to Aboriginal Consultation and Accommodations: 
Updated Guidelines for Federal Officials to Fulfill the Duty to Consult, states that 
“The Government of Canada will use and rely on, where appropriate, existing 
consultation mechanisms, processes and expertise, such as environmental 
assessment and regulatory approval processes in which Aboriginal consultation 
will be integrated, to coordinate decision making and will assess if additional 
consultation activities may be necessary.”100 The approach seeks, as far as practical, 
to integrate the duty to consult with the EA process, and with regulatory 
processes. In order to coordinate this process across the various departments of the 
federal government, the Federal Guidelines identify the Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency as the Crown consultation coordinator, and clarifies the roles 
of other participants, such as other responsible authorities, proponents, and, 
other regulatory agencies in the EA process.101
Provincial governments have likewise sought to integrate consultation within 
their EA processes.102 In a number of cases, the provincial guidelines explicitly 
incorporate directions to project proponents to carry out the “procedural aspects 
of consultation.”103 For example, the BC Guide to Involving Proponents when 
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process explicitly identifies 
which matters are “procedural aspects” of consultation and which matters cannot 
be delegated. The areas subject to delegation include:
• Providing information about the proposed project to First Nations 
early in planning process;
• Obtaining and discussing information about specific Aboriginal 
interests that may be impacted with First Nations;
• Considering modifications to plans to avoid or mitigate impacts to 
Aboriginal Interests; and
100. Federal Guidelines, supra note 31 at 14.
101. Ibid.
102. British Columbia, Environmental Assessment Office, Guide to Involving Proponents when 
Consulting First Nations in the Environmental Assessment Process (Victoria: Ministry of 
Aboriginal Relations and Reconciliation, 2013) [BC Guide]; Saskatchewan, Environmental 
Assessment Branch, Consultation with First Nations and Métis in Saskatchewan Environmental 
Impact Assessment: Guidelines for Engaging and Consulting with First Nations and Métis 
Communities in Relation to Environmental Assessment in Saskatchewan (Regina: Ministry of 
Environment, 2014) [Saskatchewan Guide].
103. BC Guide, supra note 102 at 4; Saskatchewan Guide, supra note 102 at 4.
CRAIK,  PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION 654
• Documenting engagement, specific Aboriginal interests that may 
be impacted, and any modifications to address concerns, and 
providing this record to EAO.
The following decisions remain the responsibility of the Crown:
• The strength of a First Nation’s claimed Aboriginal rights or title;
• Whether Crown decisions regarding a proposed project represents 
potential infringements of treaty rights; and
• The adequacy of the Crown’s duty to consult and accommodate.104
In addition to general guidelines, governments have developed consultation 
frameworks on a case-by-case basis. For example, the federal government has 
developed Aboriginal consultation frameworks setting out how the federal 
government will conduct consultation in the context of complex regulatory 
proceedings involving administrative tribunals, such as review panels under 
the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act (CEAA).105 The role of tribunals 
in satisfying the duty to consult was considered in Beckman, and some of the 
complications as they relate to EA proceedings are discussed below. The practice 
that is emerging is to distribute consultation activities across different phases 
of the approvals process and use the hearing process as the central vehicle for 
consultation, although inserting opportunities for direct consultation with the 
Crown.106 The result in these cases is a separation between the “procedural aspects” 
104. BC Guide, supra note 102 at 3. See also Responsible Energy Development Act, SA 2012, 
c R-17.3, s 21 (noting that the Regulator is prevented from assessing adequacy of 
Crown consultation).
105. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation Framework 
for the Northern Gateway Pipeline Project” online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/
documents/40955/40955E.pdf> [“Northern Gateway”]; Canadian Environmental 
Assessment Agency, “Federal Aboriginal Consultation Framework for the Lower Churchill 
Hydroelectric Generation Project” (13 August 2010) online: <http://ceaa.gc.ca/050/
documents/44762/44762E.pdf>.
106. Northern Gateway, supra note 105. For example, in the approvals process for the Northern 
Gateway pipeline, which required both an EA and approval of the National Energy 
Board, the Consultation Framework identified five distinct phases: (1) Involving initial 
engagement of potentially affected Aboriginal groups and consulting on the development of 
the Joint Review Panel (JPR) process; (2) Involving the lead to the JRP, where information 
is exchanged among the parties; (3) The hearing itself, including the preparation by the 
JRP of its reports and recommendations, which may include recommendations aimed at 
accommodation, but may not include determinations as the strength of Aboriginal claims or 
the adequacy of consultation; (4) Consultation with the Crown Consultation Coordinator 
on the JRP EA report, which is reported to the Cabinet, which then makes a determination 
on the government’s response to the JRP report; and (5) Involving additional consultation on 
further regulatory approvals.
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of the duty from the decision itself. This has lead governments to restrict the 
mandates of some consultation bodies by preventing those bodies from making 
determinations of the strength of claim and from assessing the adequacy of the 
Crown’s fulfillment of the duty to consult.107
C. SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
1. APPLICATION AND SCREENING
Picking up on the point above, the Crown will need to make a determination as 
to whether a regulatory process engages the duty to consult and at which point 
within that process consultation ought to be commenced. Within EA processes, 
the initial determinations of whether an EA shall be conducted and, if so, what 
form the EA shall take, are referred to as screening processes. Under current 
federal rules, the government has almost unconstrained discretion to determine 
whether an EA should be conducted,108 but under prior legislation a full EA 
was triggered where a project was determined to have a likelihood of having a 
significant environmental impact.109
The basic rule respecting when the duty to consult arises was stated in 
Haida as occurring “when the Crown has knowledge, real or constructive, of the 
potential existence of the Aboriginal right or title and contemplates conduct that 
might adversely affect it.”110 The obligation, which relates to Crown conduct, is 
much broader than the application of EA, which is typically restricted to physical 
projects.111 The different scope of application has led to some difficult practical 
questions about when consultation needs to be engaged. One source of difficulty 
is that project-planning processes are not necessarily discrete activities, but rather 
occur in the context of other enabling decisions on policies and programs. 
This issue first arose in Haida, which involved the granting of a tree farm 
licence. The tree farm licence did not authorize the harvesting of trees, which 
required further permits. The BC government argued that while it did not consult 
at the stage of granting the tree farm licence, it intended to consult prior to the 
107. Ibid.
108. CEAA, supra note 2, s 10.
109. Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, SC 1992, c 37, s 20 [CEAA, 1992]. Under this Act, 
a comprehensive EA was required for projects identified by regulation. Where not specifically 
included in regulation, a screening EA was conducted. If the EA indicated a likelihood of 
significant effect, or if it was uncertain about impacts or public concerns warranted, it would 
require the responsible authority to refer the project to mediation or a review panel. Federal 
EAs apply only to activities that involve identified federal ‘triggers.’ See ibid, s 5.
110. Haida, supra note 1 at para 35.
111. See e.g. CEAA, supra note 2, s 2(1) (defining “designated project”).
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issuance of cutting permits. In holding that the duty to consult applies to the 
tree farm licence, the SCC recognized that the strategic-level decision strongly 
influenced the subsequent outcomes, and leaving consultation to a later stage 
would prevent meaningful consultation.112 The extension of the duty to consult 
to “strategic, higher level decisions”113 was confirmed by the SCC in Rio Tinto, 
which noted that the duty ought to include decisions respecting higher-level or 
structural changes to resource management schemes, as those changes may “set 
the stage for further decisions that will have a direct adverse impact on land 
and resources.”114
A form of strategic planning is often associated with large scale, complex 
development processes, such as pipelines or large facilities that engage multiple 
regulatory processes, often across jurisdictions. For example, the Mackenzie gas 
pipeline spans multiple jurisdictions and engages EA and other environmental 
regulatory requirements at territorial, provincial, and federal levels, as well as 
National Energy Board approvals. In order to manage and streamline these 
multiple processes, a Cooperation Plan was developed among the regulators. 
Other interested parties in the proceedings, including the project proponents, were 
consulted as part of the development of this process. The Dene Tha’ First Nation 
was not consulted and challenged the proceedings on the basis of the Crown’s 
failure to consult. In holding that the Dene Tha’s rights to consultation were 
breached, the Federal Court characterized the Cooperation Plan as “strategic,” 
in the sense that the issues determined through the Cooperation Plan had the 
potential to adversely affect the rights of the Dene Tha’. As a consequence, the 
Crown’s duty extended to the creation of the Cooperation Plan, but the Dene 
Tha’ were not even given notice of the Cooperation Plan, let alone meaningfully 
consulted about the process.115 
While the court used the term “strategic,” the focus remains project 
oriented. EA practice also includes processes for the assessment of higher-level 
policy, planning, and programming decisions, often referred to as strategic 
environmental assessment (SEA).116 While these processes are well developed in 
other jurisdictions, they remain largely ad hoc and informal in the Canadian 
112. Haida, supra note 1 at para 76.
113. Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 44.
114. Ibid at para 47.
115. Dene Tha’ First Nation v Canada (Minister of Environment), 2006 FC 1354 at para 3, 153 
ACWS (3d) 1 [Dene Tha’, FC].
116. Robert B Gibson et al, “Strengthening Strategic Environmental Assessment in Canada: 
An Evaluation of Three Basic Options” (2010) 20:3 J Envtl L & Prac 175 [Gibson et al, 
“Strengthening SEA”].
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context.117 Nevertheless, the underlying justification for early consultation 
suggests that the duty to consult will extend to upstream policy decisions.
Whether a preliminary proceeding will trigger the duty to consult depends 
on the extent to which those earlier proceedings are likely to prejudice future 
decisions. One of the benefits of integrating the duty to consult with EA is that 
the EA process provides a mechanism for gathering a great deal of project specific 
information on potential impacts. The context specific nature of EA allows 
interested parties to understand how a proposal impacts their interests. However, 
as decisions become more abstracted from the project and more diffuse and indirect 
in their impact, determining whether a policy decision has an adverse impact will 
become more difficult. For example, the Federal Court of Appeal in Hupacasath 
First Nation v Canada (Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada) held that 
the conclusion of a trade agreement that may constrain government resources 
policy was too speculative to give rise to the duty to consult.118 It should also 
be realized that the connection between higher-level decisions and subsequent 
project-level decisions may be more apparent in hindsight.
In a case involving the Northern Gateway Pipeline process, the Gitxaala 
First Nation argued that their non-involvement in a marine safety review process 
that formed the background to the larger EA process on the pipeline was a 
breach of their right to be consulted. In denying the claim, however, the Federal 
Court found that the marine safety report did not determine any rights in the 
broader approvals process and its findings could be challenged within the EA 
process itself.119 The court also held that given that there was a further public 
consultation established under the EA and other processes, the Gitxaala First 
Nation’s objections were premature.120 The question that courts must turn their 
attention to in these instances is the extent to which the prior process creates 
“clear momentum” that forecloses or narrows the subsequent proceedings.121 
117. See e.g. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, The Cabinet Directive on the 
Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (Ottawa: Canadian 
Environmental Assessment Agency, 2010), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/Content/B/3/1/
B3186435-E3D0-4671-8F23-2042A82D3F8F/Cabinet_Directive_on_Environmental_
Assessment_of_Policy_Plan_and_Program_Proposals.pdf>. This federal directive is 
non-binding and has not found much purchase in the development process. See also Gibson 
et al, “Strengthening SEA,” supra note 116.
118. 2015 FCA 4, 379 DLR (4th) 737.
119. Gitxaala Nation v Canada (Transport, Infrastructure and Communities), 2012 FC 1336 at 
para 51, 224 ACWS (3d) 1 [Gitxaala].
120. Ibid at para 54.
121. Ibid at para 40, citing Sambaa k’e Dene Band v Duncan, 2012 FC 204 at paras 164-166, 
[2012] FCJ No 216.
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Whether the prior process in binding is not determinative of the matter, but 
rather the courts appear to look at the practical effect of the prior process. The 
degree to which a subsequent process can remedy an earlier failure to consult also 
appears to be a factor.122
Where the screening assessment discloses adverse impacts on Aboriginal 
interests, the Crown, under EA legislation, maintains broad discretion to not 
conduct an EA and to address the duty to consult in a process outside of an 
EA. However, such a decision, particularly where the Aboriginal group seeks 
an EA as the preferred mode of consultation, may defeat the purposes of the 
CEAA, which include the promotion of “communication and cooperation with 
aboriginal peoples with respect to environmental assessment.”123 Conducting 
an EA may be understood as a form of accommodation itself, since systematic 
identification and assessment of impacts through EA can be understood as 
an appropriate and proportionate means to address those impacts. It remains 
an open question whether the Crown is obligated to exercise its discretion in 
relation to determining whether or not to conduct an EA in a manner that most 
fully accords with its constitutional duty. At a minimum, the screening process 
should be conducted in a manner consistent with the duty to consult, including 
providing appropriate levels of participation and justification. Adherence to the 
45-day time limit, as required under the CEAA, to the detriment of the duty to 
consult, is likely to be unconstitutional.124
One further issue that is likely to arise in the screening stage is how the 
assessment of the strength of claim is integrated into the EA screening process. 
Properly assessing the strength of claim is critical to determining the proper level 
of consultation and the choice of procedures, a central element to screening. 
However, the assessment of the strength of claim often requires complex 
evidence, which may be difficult to gather at the initial stages of the EA and 
which the Crown and First Nations may be reluctant to fully disclose where 
the claim is being contested and is subject to a broader set of negotiations. The 
BCCA suggested that a failure to conduct a strength of claim assessment is 
not in itself a breach of the duty to consult, but may require that the default 
position be deep consultation.125 In a recent federal EA process on the Roberts 
122. Ibid at para 34.
123. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4(1)(d).
124. This follows from the dicta that the “Crown’s duty to consult cannot be boxed in by 
legislation.” See KTFN, 2007, supra note 92 at para 121.
125. Halalt First Nation v British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 472 at para 118, 222 ACWS (3d) 558 
[Halalt]. See also NNTC, supra note 97 at para 72.
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Bank Terminal, the Aboriginal consultation guidelines state the review panel is to 
“take assertions of Aboriginals rights at face value during the EA process,”126 also 
suggesting that the strength of claim will be assumed, rather than assessed at this 
stage of consultation. 
While this approach appears to benefit Aboriginal groups by defaulting to a 
deeper level of consultation, it raises questions about the meaningfulness of the 
consultations that follow. Those engaging in consultation on behalf of the Crown 
are making recommendations on the acceptability of impacts and mitigation 
measures, which is a form of accommodation. Meaningful consultation on 
these matters would seem to require some understanding of the nature of the 
interests and the strength of claim being asserted. The ultimate decision makers 
can turn their attention to the adequacy of accommodation,127 but conducting 
the EA without a clear strength of claim analysis leaves the Aboriginal group 
conducting consultations with Crown agents that may only be partially aware of 
what is at stake.
2. SCOPING
Once a decision has been made to conduct an EA, the next stage in the EA 
process is the determination of which issues ought to be addressed through the 
EA process. This stage is referred to as scoping. The range of issues addressed by 
EA is potentially broad enough to include most of the issues that will arise in 
the context of the duty to consult.128 In the case of the CEAA, the definition of 
“environmental effects” explicitly includes a broad range of effects on Aboriginal 
peoples, including impacts on “health and socio-economic conditions, physical 
and cultural heritage, the current use of lands and resources for traditional 
purposes, or any structure, site or thing that is of historical [or] archeological 
… significance.”129 The effects must arise from changes to the environment that 
relate to the project. The restriction to “current” use of lands and resources for 
traditional purposes may be overly restrictive to fully account for the interests 
that are protected by the duty to consult. The scope of effects considered here 
126. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, “Aboriginal Consultation and Environmental 
Assessment Handout” (November 2014), online: <www.ceaa.gc.ca/050/documents/
p80054/100180E.pdf>.
127. Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 25.
128. Again, there is some variation across federal, provincial, and territorial EA systems in relation 
to the scope of assessments. Generally, the scope focuses on bio-physical impacts, but 
includes health, socio-economic, and cultural impacts that arise from environmental change. 
See CEAA, supra note 2, s 5(2)(b).
129. CEAA, supra note 2, s 5(c) [numbering omitted; emphasis added].
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should be interpreted to be consistent with scope of the constitutional rights 
being asserted, an approach that is consistent with the broader purposes of 
the Act.130 What is clearly excluded from the process are broader questions of 
unresolved land claims.131
An area of growing importance in relation to the scope of assessment 
is the degree to which cumulative effects are assessed. Assessing cumulative 
environmental effects requires consideration of the impact of the activity under 
review, while taking into account the combined effect from other activities that 
have been or will be carried out.132 The significance of cumulative effects in the 
context of the duty to consult was acknowledged by the SCC in Beckman, where 
Justice Binnie noted that “the severity of the impact of land grants, whether 
taken individually or cumulatively, properly constituted an important element of 
consultation.”133 The Federal Court in Brokenhead similarly commented, “While 
the environmental footprint of any one project might appear quite modest, the 
eventual cumulative impact of development on the rights and traditional interests 
of Aboriginal peoples can be quite profound.”134 This sentiment is repeated by the 
British Columbia Supreme Court (BCSC) in Taseko Mines Limited v Phillips, 
an injunction case where, in holding the balance of convenience favoured the 
Aboriginal group, the court noted: 
Each new incursion serves only to narrow further the habitat left to them in which 
to exercise their traditional rights. Consequently, each new incursion becomes 
more significant than the last. Each newly cleared trail remains a scar, for although 
reclamation is required, restoration is impossible. The damage is irreparable. It 
follows that if only a portion of the proposed new clearings and trails prove to be 
unnecessary, the preservation of that portion is vital.135
Cumulative effects could influence the determination of the strength of 
claim insofar as the Haida test requires courts to consider the impact of the 
development on the exercise of the asserted rights. A project, when considered in 
isolation, may have only a minor impact, such as early stage mineral exploration, 
giving rise to a duty at the low end of the duty to consult spectrum. However, 
when considered in combination with other activities, the impact may be more 
130. Ibid, s 4.
131. Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 27.
132. CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(a).
133. Beckman, supra note 4 at para 21.
134. Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 28.
135. Taseko Mines Limited v Phillips, 2011 BCSC 1675 at para 65, 64 CELR (3d) 84 [Taseko]. 
See also Lameman v Alberta, 2012 ABCA 59, 348 DLR (4th) 45; Lameman v Alberta, 2011 
ABQB 40, [2011] AJ No 82.
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL661
profound, leading to a more extensive duty to consult and accommodate. 
Addressing cumulative effects poses a significant challenge to the efficient 
management of EA in Aboriginal contexts and may increasingly push regulators 
towards planning and licensing models that can account for multiple projects.136 
SEA may provide some basis to assess cumulative effects where the upstream 
policy or plan considers impacts on a regional scale. But to date the available 
tools to perform these kinds of assessments are poorly developed, and continue 
to lead to disputes respecting the assessment of cumulative impacts over time.137
There has been some controversy surrounding whether consideration of 
impacts from existing and approved projects contravenes the holding in Rio 
Tinto—i.e., that the duty to consult does not extend to consultation on the 
impacts of past projects.138 This issue was raised squarely in West Moberly First 
Nations v British Columbia (Chief Inspector of Mines).139 In this case, the central 
issue was the impacts of a coalmine exploration and sampling project on caribou 
herds that had already been significantly depleted. The decision to approve, which 
did not fully consider the cumulative impacts of the past activities or the future 
development of the mine, was stayed pending further consultation. In upholding 
the BCSC’s decision, the BCCA distinguished Rio Tinto, noting that the West 
Moberly First Nations (WMFN) was not seeking consultation on past decisions, 
but rather was seeking consultation of the impacts from the proposal in light of 
the severely degraded ecological conditions that prevailed:
I do not understand Rio Tinto to be authority for saying that when the “current 
decision under consideration” will have an adverse impact on a First Nations right, 
as in this case, that what has gone before is irrelevant. Here, the exploration and 
sampling projects will have an adverse impact on the petitioners’ treaty right, and 
the historical context is essential to a proper understanding of the seriousness of the 
potential impacts on the petitioners’ treaty right to hunt.140
136. See Fort McKay First Nation v Alberta (Minister of Environment and Sustainable Resource 
Development), 2014 ABQB 393, [2014] AJ No 683 [Fort McKay]; Dene Tha’ First 
Nation v British Columbia (Minister of Energy and Mines), 2013 BCSC 977, [2013] 11 
WWR 764 [Dene Tha’, BCSC]; E Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” (2011) 54:2 
SCLR 493 at 517.
137. See Blueberry River First Nations v British Columbia, 2015 BCSC 1302, [2015] BCJ No 
1600 [Blueberry].
138. Rio Tinto, supra note 10 at para 45 (“[t]he claimant must show a causal relationship… .”).
139. 2011 BCCA 247, 202 ACWS (3d) 214 [WMFN].
140. Ibid at para 117. See also Upper Nicola Indian Band v British Columbia (Environment), 
2011 BCSC 388, 200 ACWS (3d) 1.
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Additionally, the court went to hold that the chambers judge did not err 
in considering future impacts “beyond the immediate consequences of the 
exploration permits,” and further held that “to the extent that MEMPR [the 
approving regulator] failed to consider the impact of a full mining operation in 
the area of concern, it failed to provide meaningful consultation.”141 This holding 
is best understood in light of the prevailing practice in relation to scoping 
cumulative effects, which maintains that only “likely” cumulative effects need 
be considered.142
A second issue that has yet to receive significant judicial consideration is the 
requirement within EA processes to consider alternatives to the proposal and the 
environmental effects of those alternatives.143 Alternatives have been described 
in the US National Environmental Policy Act regulations, which contain the 
federal EA requirements, as “the heart of the environmental impact statement 
… providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decision-maker and 
the public.”144 Alternatives analysis plays a particularly important role in light of 
the absence of clear quantitative standards to assess the acceptability of impacts. 
Alternatives provide an evaluative substitute in the sense that the impacts from the 
proposed activity can be measured against the impacts of a proposed alternative. 
In relation to the duty to consult, alternatives provide a basis to assess forms of 
accommodation. If a First Nation identifies a reasonable alternative that would 
have less of an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights and interests, then there is, 
at a minimum, a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate why that 
alternative was not preferred.
The issue of alternatives arose in WMFN, where the WMFN put forward 
what was effectively a “no action” alternative, asking that the exploration permits 
be refused. This alternative was not seriously considered and no indication was 
given as to why this position was impractical or unreasonable. In upholding that 
141. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 125. See also Allan Adam v Canada (Minister of the 
Environment), 2014 FC 1185 at para 85, [2014] FCJ No 1248; White River First Nation v 
Yukon Government, 2013 YKSC 66 at para 136, 79 CELR (3d) 276 [WRFN]; Fort McKay, 
supra note 136 at para 115.
142. Bow Valley Naturalists Society v Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] 2 FC 
461 at para 41, 102 ACWS (3d) 1103. See also Canada, Minister of the Environment, 
Assessing Cumulative Environmental Effects under the Canadian Environmental Assessment 
Act, 2012 (Ottawa: Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, 2015) at 4 (noting that 
a cumulative environmental effects assessment of a designated project must include future 
physical activities that are certain and should generally include physical activities that are 
reasonably foreseeable).
143. CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(g).
144. Protection of Environment, 40 CFR § 1502.14 (2012).
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL663
this failure was a reviewable error, the BCCA noted that the lack of engagement 
of the WMFN’s preferred position effectively meant that the consultation 
was limited to mitigation of effects and thus did not recognize the full range 
of possible outcomes. This, in the court’s view, amounted “to nothing more 
than an opportunity for the First Nations ‘to blow off steam.’”145 The Crown 
was not required to accept the WMFN’s alternative, which would amount to a 
veto, but was required to “provide a satisfactory, reasoned explanation as to why 
their position was not accepted.”146 Alternatives analysis is not an established 
approach to the duty to consult; nevertheless, it furthers the underlying purpose 
of meaningful consultation. In particular, the notion of a preferred alternative 
aligns with the idea articulated in the Sparrow test that Aboriginal groups 
ought to be able to exercise their rights with minimal impairment and in their 
preferred manner.147 
As with other scoping decisions, the challenge will be determining the 
potential range of reasonable alternatives. In some cases, such as the CEAA, the 
range of alternatives to be considered may be qualified by the legislature. The CEAA 
limits the requirement to consider alternatives to “alternative means of carrying 
out the designated project that are technically and economically feasible.”148 This 
is a fairly narrow range of alternatives, which excludes consideration of ‘no action’ 
alternatives or alternatives to the project itself, both of which were included in 
the pre-2012 version of the CEAA.149 However, the range of preferred alternatives 
sought by Aboriginal groups may be much broader and a statutory requirement 
that limits alternatives to those that are economically feasible may subordinate 
Aboriginal rights to economic considerations without clear justification on the 
facts.150 In these circumstances, an overly restrictive approach to consideration of 
alternatives in EA is out of step with the duty to consult.
145. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 149.
146. Ibid at para 148.
147. Sparrow, supra note 19. 
148. CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(g); CEAA, 1992, supra note 109, s 16(2)(b).
149. CEAA, 1992, supra note 109, s 16. Included as permissive factors to consider were 
“alternatives to” the project (ibid, s 16(1)(e)) and to consider the “need” for the project (ibid, 
s 16(2)(c)), effectively raising the ‘no action’ alternative. See also Meinhard Doelle, “CEAA 
2012: The End of Federal EA As We Know It?” (2013) 24 J Envtl L & Prac 1 at 13.
150. See CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(j). Note that nothing prevents the Crown from considering 
a broader range of factors if it chooses.
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3. PARTICIPATION
There are several important differences in relation to the participation requirements 
under EA and the duty to consult. First, Aboriginals are entitled to be consulted as 
First Nations, and not simply as members of the general public. Thus, in Mikisew, 
it was held that a public forum was not a substitute for formal consultation.151 Even 
at the lower end of the spectrum, as was the case in Mikisew, “engagement ought 
to have included the provision of information about the project addressing what 
the Crown knew to be Mikisew interests and what the Crown anticipated might 
be the potential adverse impact on those interests.”152 Public notice and comment 
processes in relation to EA activities, including consultation on the structure of 
the process and scoping, without something more, are not likely to be sufficient.153
Second, the courts have generally held that the right to consultation falls 
to the Aboriginal group itself, and not individual members within the group.154 
Thus, in a case involving a request for an injunction enjoining a blockade, the 
individuals taking part in the blockade maintained that they had not been 
consulted. The BCSC, in granting the injunction, noted that such rights were 
held by the First Nation itself, and on the facts, the First Nations affected had 
been adequately consulted.155 Nevertheless, individuals who belong to First 
Nations will have rights as members of the public under the EA process that are 
not detracted from by virtue of their membership in a First Nation, but those 
rights will be of the same nature as those held by non-Aboriginals.
The more difficult question relates to who must carry out the consultations 
on behalf of the Crown during the EA process. As noted, the SCC in Haida drew 
a distinction between the procedural and non-procedural aspects of the duty to 
consult, indicating that the former may be delegated. The practical problem that 
needs to be addressed is that decision-making processes for large-scale projects are 
often very complicated, involving multiple agencies, review panels, and federal 
and provincial governments. The trend in EA procedure has been to seek to 
reduce overlap through joint panels and substituted decision making. Mapping 
the duty to consult on to these procedures is likely to present legal uncertainty. 
151. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 64.
152. Ibid.
153. Dene Tha’, FC, supra note 115 at para 104.
154. Newman, supra note 29 at 65, citing R v Lefthand, 2007 ABCA 206, 222 CCC (3d) 
129 (noting that the issue was not fully closed, as arguments that some Aboriginal rights 
might be individually held were made in Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd, 2013 SCC 26, 
[2013] 2 SCR 227).
155. Red Chris Development Co v Quock, 2006 BCSC 1472, 152 ACWS (3d) 706. 
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For example, the issue of substitution, whereby one level of government agrees 
to substitute its EA process for the process of another level, has been challenged 
in the Northern Gateway pipeline process on the basis that the provincial 
government cannot delegate its duty to consult to federal agencies.156 
One result of the use of panels in EA processes is the parceling out of the duty 
to consult among different actors with different mandates. The emerging federal 
practice is to use the panel reviews as the primary mechanism for informing 
Aboriginal groups of the project and receiving information from those groups on 
their interests and how those interests might be affected. The panel may make 
recommendations, but it has a restricted mandate that excludes determinations 
on questions of strength of claim and on the adequacy of the consultation process 
itself. Further consultation over the panel’s recommendations, particularly around 
mitigation measures, is undertaken with the Crown Consultation Coordinator, 
who in turns reports on the adequacy of consultation to Cabinet.157 On that 
basis Cabinet can make an independent determination on the adequacy of the 
consultation and accommodation. 
The extent to which EA processes merely facilitate Aboriginal understanding 
of the project, but leave consultation to a parallel process, is likely to remain a 
source of tension. As noted, where consultation arises outside of the EA process, 
it must nonetheless offer the possibility of modification of the project to address 
impacts on Aboriginal rights in order to be meaningful. However, where the 
modifications give rise to substantially different environmental consequences, 
further environmental assessment and consultation with non-Aboriginal 
stakeholders may be warranted.
The courts have not questioned the overall ability of these staged processes 
to implement the duty to consult.158 Nonetheless, the adequacy of consultation 
in these types of EA proceedings may turn on whether the resulting consultation 
meets the qualitative requirement for “meaningful” consultation. WRFN 
is illustrative.159 An EA evaluation report of a mine was carried out and 
156. See e.g. Gitxaala, supra note 119. For the facta in the proceedings, see West Coast 
Environment Law, “Legal Backgrounder—What are the Northern Gateway Court 
Challenges About?” (July 2015), online: <wcel.org/category/publication/legal-backgrounder-
what-are-northern-gateway-court-challenges-about>. See also Gord Hoekstra, “First Nations 
challenge B.C. government in court over Northern Gateway pipeline,” The Vancouver Sun (14 
January 2015), online: <www.vancouversun.com/technology/First+Nations+challenge+gover
nment+court+over+Northern+Gateway+pipeline/10725742/story.html?__lsa=e529-fc4c>.
157. Northern Gateway, supra note 105.
158. Innu, supra note 93 at para 113.
159. Supra note 140.
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recommended against approving the mine on the basis of its potential impact on 
a caribou herd that had significance for the exercise of the WRFN’s Aboriginal 
rights. The Director of Mineral Resources rejected the report’s findings and 
granted approval. The Director consulted the WRFN, but the consultation 
did not involve a clear disclosure of the Director’s basis for rejecting the report, 
which was supported by the WRFN. The court held that the duty to consult 
was not met in these circumstances because the consultation did not amount to 
an “exchange of views.”160 In particular, because the WRFN was not provided 
with any basis for the Director’s rejection of the report, they had no opportunity 
to present their views or challenge the decision. The Supreme Court of Yukon 
noted that “[f ]airness and the honour of the Crown require that the First Nation 
be given an opportunity and time to put forward their view when the Decision 
Body, as here, is contemplating a decision completely at odds with the one that 
was rendered after an in-depth consultation process.”161
One final point in relation to consultation under the EA process picks up 
on Sossin’s argument that in order for consultation to be meaningful, the Crown 
may be required to take positive steps to facilitate Aboriginal participation.162 
Given the technical nature of EA processes and the often highly specialized 
information and expertise requirements EA processes involve, adequate funding 
is likely to be a potential source of contention. The potential for financial 
assistance is acknowledged in relation to EA in federal and provincial consultation 
guidelines,163 and in cases where the courts have upheld EA processes as satisfying 
the duty to consult, such as Taku River, the Crown has provided financial 
assistance.164 Aboriginal groups who seek to challenge the EA on the basis that 
funding was required to facilitate meaningful consultation must demonstrate 
the need for the funding clearly and cannot simply insist upon their preferred 
method of participation (and its associated costs).165
4. THE DECISION
Since both the duty to consult and EA are underlain by good faith, the provision 
of reasons is of central importance. It is only through the provision of reasons 
160. Ibid at para 112. 
161. Ibid at para 123.
162. Supra note 29 at 107.
163. Federal Guidelines, supra note 31 at 30; BC Guide, supra note 102 at 3.
164. Taku River, supra note 1 at para 37. See also KTFN, supra note 25 at para 113; Katlodeeche 
First Nation v Canada (Attorney General), 2013 FC 458 at para 167, [2013] FCJ No 520; 
Halalt, supra note 125.
165. Innu, supra note 93 at para 129.
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by which the Aboriginal group (in the case of the duty to consult) and the 
public (in the case of EA) can assess whether the concerns raised were given 
serious consideration. The challenge for reviewing courts is to separate good faith 
consultations from processes that are merely intended to allow Aboriginal groups 
to “blow off steam.”166
The obligation to provide reasons arises at the higher end of the consultation 
spectrum.167 It is required not only in relation to the final decision, but also 
in relation to interim decisions, respecting screening and scoping, for example, 
that impact asserted Aboriginal rights.168 The relationship between a reasoned 
justification and the duty was set out forcefully in the WMFN decision, where the 
court found that the failure to provide reasons for the rejection of the WMFN’s 
preferred alternative contravened the duty to consult:
To be considered reasonable, I think the consultation process, and hence the 
“Rationale”, would have to provide an explanation to the petitioners that, not 
only had their position been fully considered, but that there were persuasive 
reasons why the course of action the petitioners proposed was either not necessary, 
was impractical, or was otherwise unreasonable. Without a reasoned basis for 
rejecting the petitioners’ position, there cannot be said to have been a meaningful 
consultation.169
The practice under EA in relation to the provision of reasons is uneven. In 
some cases, the courts have held that assessment reports cannot simply come to 
bald conclusions respecting the significance of impacts, but rather must provide 
some reasoned basis for the conclusions reached.170 However, high-level decisions 
respecting projects often take a more declaratory form.171 In Adam v Canada 
(Minister of the Environment), the Athabasca Chipewyan First Nation (ACFN) 
166. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 54.
167. Haida, supra note 1 at para 44.
168. Ibid.
169. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 144.
170. Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 
302, 80 Admin LR (4th) 74 [Pembina]. The court ruled:
I recognize that placing an administrative burden on the Panel to provide an in-depth 
explanation of the scientific data for all of its conclusions and recommendations would be 
disproportionately high. However, given that the Report is to serve as an objective basis for 
a final decision, the Panel must, in my opinion, explain in a general way why the potential 
environmental effects, either with or without the implementation of mitigation measures, 
will be insignificant (ibid at para 73).
171. See e.g. CEAA, supra note 2. These revised EA rules removed a requirement to provide 
reasons for not following a review panel’s recommendation found in CEAA, 1992, supra note 
109, s 53(2)(c) .
CRAIK,  PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION 668
challenged a decision taken under section 52 of the CEAA that determined that 
the impacts from the Jackpine oil sands expansion project, while significant, 
were justified in the circumstances.172 The Cabinet decision and accompanying 
decision statement provided no justification for this determination. The Federal 
Court, in dismissing the appeal, stated rather opaquely that the Crown was not 
required to justify the Cabinet’s decision, so long as it provided a justification 
of its rejection of ACFN’s position within the broader process.173 The thrust of 
the Federal Court’s decision in Adam is that so long as the Crown meets its 
procedural requirements—in this case the ACFN participated in a lengthy and 
extensive panel process and was further invited to make representations on 
whether the report captured its concerns—and shows that it gave the Aboriginal 
group’s concerns serious consideration, the duty will be satisfied. 
Sossin argues that the underlying substantive nature of accommodation 
imposes a greater constraint on the Crown, requiring the Crown “to show 
that governments’ substantive position has been modified as a result” of 
consultation.174 If Sossin is right, then a critical element of any consultation will 
be assessing mitigation measures and the acceptability of impacts in light of the 
strength of claim. As the strength of claim approaches the very high end, one 
would expect that the justification would also approach that which is required 
to justify the infringement of an established right—namely, a substantial and 
compelling objective. 
The prevailing approach identifies mitigation measures that, in the Crown’s 
view, minimize the adverse effects to Aboriginal interests. The extent to which 
the proposed activity may still adversely impact Aboriginal interests and the basis 
upon which those potential impacts are justified is not readily disclosed.175 As 
noted, in many instances the actual assessment is undertaken without a coinciding 
strength of claim analysis and the acceptable mitigation measures are determined, 
in the first instance, in the absence of knowledge of the strength of claim.
5. STANDARD OF REVIEW AND REMEDIES FOR BREACH
The standard of review for matters involving legal interpretations of EA 
legislation is correctness, while the standard for application of evidence and 
exercise of discretion (i.e., questions of mixed fact and law) within EA processes 
172. 2014 FC 1185, 250 ACWS (3d) 541 [Adam].
173. Ibid at para 81.
174. Supra note 29 at 107.
175. Adam, supra note 172 at para 181.
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is reasonableness.176 Thus, decisions respecting screening and scoping of EAs will 
be reviewed on the basis of reasonableness. In relation to the duty to consult, 
the standard of review was addressed in Haida, with the accepted approach 
being to review questions regarding the existence and content of the duty on a 
correctness standard and questions respecting the adequacy of consultation and 
accommodation on a reasonableness standard.177 Subsequent decisions have noted 
that the determination of the existence of a duty, which involves assessments of 
the strength of claim and the serious of the impacts, may involve findings of fact, 
in which case some deference will be owed to the decision maker.178 
Separating out what may constitute the “scope and extent”179 of the duty from 
how that duty is discharged in the context of EA will not always be straightforward. 
For example, a screening decision, which involves a determination of whether 
there is a likelihood of significant environmental impact, will be treated with 
deference under EA processes. However, insofar as determining the significance 
of impacts on Aboriginal interests goes to the extent of the duty to consult, it may 
be treated on a correctness standard, as appears to be the approach in WRFN.180 
Much will turn on the extent to which the court views the determination to be 
driven by factual considerations, in which case greater deference will likely be 
shown. There is evidence that the approach in relation to the implementation 
of the duty through EA will be looked at functionally, with the court assessing 
whether the process that was followed allowed for “meaningful consultation.” 
In WMFN, the BCCA effectively equated a consultation process that was not 
meaningful with unreasonableness.181 What the courts recognize here is that the 
consultation process itself, which often involves consultation on the form of the 
EA, determines the correctness of the scope.182 
In assessing the actual outcomes of EA processes, the court will again look 
to the reasonableness of the decision. In doing so, however, courts need to be 
mindful of the central importance of justification to the consultation process. In 
other words, there is a need to assess the quality of the reasons, not so much to 
ensure that the result itself is reasonable, but to ensure that the process that gave 
176. Ontario Power Generation Inc v Greenpeace Canada, 2015 FCA 186 at paras 120-21, 
[2015] FCJ No 1066. See also Pembina Institute for Appropriate Development v Canada 
(Minister of Fisheries and Oceans), 2005 FC 1123 at paras 12-13, 141 ACWS (3d) 766.
177. Haida, supra note 1 at paras 60-63; Brokenhead, supra note 94 at para 17.
178. Wii’litswx, supra note 28 at para 15; Dene Tha’, BCSC, supra note 136 at para 99. 
179. Haida, supra note 1 at para 66; Wii’litswx, supra note 28 at para 17.
180. Supra note 140 at para 95.
181. WMFN, supra note 139 at para 154. See also WRFN, supra note 140 at para 115.
182. Dene Tha’, FC, supra note 115 at para 105.
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rise to the result was meaningful and carried out in good faith. The principal form 
of accommodation that is provided through EA processes is the identification of 
mitigation measures that are intended to eliminate or reduce adverse impacts to 
asserted Aboriginal rights. In this context, meaningful consultation suggests that 
the mitigation measures, at a minimum, ought to be responsive to the preferred 
alternatives put forward by Aboriginal groups. 
Where there has been a breach of the procedural requirements of EA, the 
courts exercise broad discretion in determining the remedy. In MiningWatch, 
where Responsible Authority was found to have misapplied the scoping rules 
by scoping a mining project in an overly narrow fashion, the SCC restricted 
its remedy to declaratory relief, overturning a decision of the Federal Court to 
require further consultation and assessment in accordance with proper scoping 
requirements.183 The basis of the decision is complicated, but it included the fact 
that the complaint was procedural in nature and not in relation to the substance 
of the decision.184 The MiningWatch decision has been relied upon in at least 
one duty to consult case involving deficient EA processes to provide support for 
restricting relief to a declaration.185 
Both cases may be restricted to their unique facts, but it is important to 
recognize, in the context of remedies, that procedural deficiencies take on 
particular importance in the context of the duty to consult precisely because the 
substantive requirements are so indeterminate. The process here is to a large degree 
the ends sought. Unlike purely administrative proceedings where the court’s 
discretion to grant a remedy may consider the broader balance of convenience to 
the parties—as in MiningWatch, where the SCC felt it was unfair to burden the 
mining company with the consequences of the government’s mishandling of the 
EA—the constitutional dimensions of the duty to consult militate in favour of a 
robust approach to remedies.186
183. Supra note 39.
184. Ibid at para 52.
185. NNTC, supra note 97 at para 106.
186. WRFN, supra note 140 at para 137 (“[w]hile Tarsis is a responsible exploration company 
and its contribution is important, the participation and involvement of First Nations 
without a Final Agreement has both a statutory and a constitutional dimension that must 
be respected”).
(2016) 53 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL671
III. PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION: MATCHING THEORY 
AND PRACTICE
Early in the life of NEPA, the environmental law scholar Joseph Sax famously 
expressed his skepticism about the underlying premise of EA:
I know of no solid evidence to support the belief that requiring articulation, 
detailed findings or reasoned opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of 
administrative decisions. I think the emphasis on the redemptive quality of 
procedural reform is about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.187
Since that time, EA scholars have offered a number of different approaches 
to explain how adherence to procedural requirements brings about desired 
environmental outcomes.188 While these approaches offer an explanatory model 
for how EA affects outcomes, the approaches also tend to diverge in the role they 
ascribe to EA and the structural features of EA upon which they lay emphasis. 
One set of approaches, identified by Holder as informational theories, stresses 
the rationality of EA planning processes and focuses on the need to develop 
better technical tools and metrics for assessment, but tends to downplay value 
disputes.189 Environmentally sound outcomes arise under this model because 
decision makers are assumed to be able to accurately assess the costs of potentially 
harmful activities and avoid or mitigate unacceptable environmental outcomes in 
the public interest.190 Cultural or transformative theories, by contrast, recognize 
the normative influence that environmental information has on political processes 
and tend to understand that interactions involving environmental values can 
have transformative effects on political interests and institutional structures.191 
The emphasis under transformational approaches is on the deliberative quality of 
the interactions and the justificatory nature of the decisions.
When EA is considered in light of its role as a way to implement the duty 
to consult, informational approaches offer a limited framework to explain the 
broader aspirations of reconciliation that underlie the duty. First, informational 
approaches are premised on a single, monolithic conception of public interest. 
187. NEPA, supra note 66 at 239.
188. Bartlett & Kurian, supra note 43; James Boggs, “Procedural v. Substantive in NEPA Law: 
Cutting the Gordian Knot” (1993) 15:1 Envtl Professional 25; Taylor, supra note 43; 
Craik, supra note 43.
189. Holder, supra note 38 at 23-24.
190. Carys Jones et al, “Evaluating the SEA of Land Use Plans” in Carys Jones et al, eds, Strategic 
Environmental Assessment and Land Use Planning: An International Evaluation (Sterling, VA: 
Earthscan, 2005) at 35-36.
191. Holder, supra note 38 at 27; Boggs, supra note 189; Craik, supra note 43.
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The problems that EA addresses are technical and solvable with recourse to better 
technical information. The duty to consult, on the other hand, accepts a much 
more pluralistic and political understanding of the decision-making processes 
engaged. At the heart of the duty to accommodate is the notion of compromise 
and negotiation. Accommodation is not a technical issue that can be resolved 
with improved information. Second, informational approaches tend to view 
participation in instrumental terms, in the sense that the object of participation 
is to provide experts with additional information, whereas the duty to consult 
views participation in much more dialogical terms. The duty to consult requires 
an “exchange of views”192 and demands responses to alternatives proposed. 
Finally, the underlying theory of legitimacy under informational approaches is 
rooted in the expertise of the agency decision makers, whereas the legitimacy of 
decisions arrived at through the duty to consult is premised on the deliberative 
characteristics of participatory decision making. In other words, decisions are 
accepted under informational theories because the process is able to identify 
optimal solutions. Justification appeals to technical criteria, but is indifferent 
to the normative dimensions of the decision. There is an ahistorical element to 
informational approaches that fails to acknowledge the context of government 
mistrust that reconciliation seeks to ameliorate—good faith is assumed under 
informational theories, whereas it is required to be demonstrated under the 
duty to consult.
It might seem that informational approaches present something of a straw 
man, insofar as Canadian EA processes appear to embrace a more participatory 
model of EA. While that may be true, the technical focus that informational 
approaches suggest still has a powerful influence over how EAs are conducted 
and how courts understand them.193 Recall that, in Friends of Oldman River, the 
SCC described EA as providing an “an objective basis for granting or denying 
approval of a proposed development,” suggesting a technical, as opposed to 
political, orientation.194 Even where the courts acknowledge that EA involves “a 
large measure of opinion and judgement,” the underlying disputes are described 
in technical not political terms.195 The fundamental point I seek to make here 
is that while EA processes, and the courts that consider them, acknowledge the 
192. WRFN, supra note 141 at para 112; Sossin, supra note 29 at 95.
193. Bartlett & Kurian, supra note 43 at 417-18.
194. Supra note 39 at para 103.
195. Alberta Wilderness Association v Express Pipelines Ltd, [1996] FCJ No 1016 at para 10, 137 
DLR (4th) 177 (“people can and do disagree about the adequacy and completeness of 
evidence which forecasts future results and about the significance of such results”).
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important role of participation, it is understood in instrumental terms—it is a 
means to an end. It is in that regard that the Court in MiningWatch felt partially 
justified in offering no substantive remedy in the face of a procedural breach, 
since, in the Court’s view, there was no actual harm to the applicant, a public 
interest litigant.196
One of the outstanding puzzles in relation to the duty to accommodate is 
the extent to which the Crown has to affirmatively address Aboriginal concerns. 
The framing of the duty as a balancing test suggests a measure of ambivalence 
to outcomes, in the sense that the test provides little guidance to how that 
balance is to be achieved, leaving the determination as a matter of Crown 
discretion. Verónica Potes describes two competing approaches to the duty to 
accommodate: (1) a “procedural” approach, which views accommodation being 
satisfied by adherence to the procedural requirements of the duty to consult; and 
(2) a “purposive” approach that requires adherence to substantive standards.197 
The difficulty, as outlined in Part I, above, is that drawing a sharp distinction 
between process and substance in this context fails to capture the dynamic 
relationship between the two, and suggests that that they can be independently 
assessed. Potes is sensitive to this dynamic, but does not offer a theory of how this 
interaction may function.
Transformational theories better capture the essence of reconciliation, and 
may even provide a way of understanding reconciliation in the institutionalized 
context of project decision making. Transformational approaches do not regard 
the interests and values of the participants in EA processes as fixed, but rather 
understand that participation in the process itself may impact interests. Interest 
reformulation is endogenous to the EA process, allowing for the possibility of 
participants learning through the process and reconsidering their interests in 
light of new information and shared understandings.198
Transformational theories of EA locate the legitimacy of the outcomes within 
the deliberative qualities of the interactions, as opposed to the expertise of the 
decision makers. Looking at the quality of interactions, which is what I would 
argue is at the centre of the requirement of good faith in the duty to consult, 
requires that the parties treat each other’s position with a minimum level of 
respect, which in turn requires that decision makers be open to persuasion based 
196. MiningWatch, supra note 39 at para 52.
197. “The Duty to Accommodate Aboriginal Peoples Rights: Substantive Consultation?” (2006) 
17:1 J Envtl L & Prac 27 at 33-38. See also Sossin, supra note 29.
198. Sinclair & Diduck, supra note 63; Craik, supra note 43 at 249.
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on the arguments provided.199 The deliberative dimensions of the duty to consult 
are captured in Mikisew, where Justice Binnie linked the quality of consultation 
with the possibility of accommodation, noting that “consultation that excludes 
from the outset any form of accommodation would be meaningless.”200 
Understood through a transformational lens, the institutional deficiencies to 
which EA legislation was responding were that government decision making had 
“not been receptive to an adequate range of facts, had not been able to break away 
from well-known formulas, and had been insufficiently critical and excessively 
rigid.”201 The duty to consult responds to these same deficiencies. Justification 
takes on a heightened importance because it is not simply a description of the 
basis of the outcome as decided by the Crown, but is required to be reciprocal 
in the sense that the reasons given must respond to the concerns raised and 
must appeal to shared norms. In the context of the duty to consult, reciprocal 
justification requires that decision makers carefully consider Aboriginal 
perspectives and seek out justifications that incorporate Aboriginal values. The 
promise of transformational approaches is that reciprocal justification offers 
an opportunity for those affected by government decisions to participate in 
the elaboration of the norms of evaluation. For example, the determination of 
what constitutes a “significant” impact to the environment and to Aboriginal 
rights ought to be arrived at jointly with due regard for both Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal perspectives. Reconciliation can be understood as co-authorship 
of the norms that shape the conditions of Aboriginal lives. The self-governing 
element of co-authorship captures the need to “reconcile pre-existing Aboriginal 
sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty,”202 and the balancing of interests. 
Reconciliation fully realized suggests the possibility of the development of shared 
interests, as opposed to trading off Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal interests, and 
it is in this sense that the process can contribute to jurisgenerative potential of 
section 35 of the Charter.203
199. Simone Chambers, “Deliberative Democratic Theory” (2003) 6:1 Ann Rev Pol 
Sci 307 at 309.
200. Mikisew, supra note 1 at para 54.
201. Bartlett, “Environmental Policy Act,” supra note 63 at 110.
202. Haida, supra note 1 at para 20.
203. See Robert M Cover, “Forward: Nomos and Narrative” (1983) 97:1 Harv L Rev 4 at 11 
(introducing the concept of “jurisgenesis” as “the creation of legal meaning” and the concept 
of “jurisgenerative” to describe that process). See also Kristen A Carpenter & Angela R Riley, 
“Indigenous Peoples and the Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights” (2014) 102:1 Cal L 
Rev 173 (applying the concept of jurisgenerativity in the indigenous context).
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Returning to the form of EA commitments that will be required to 
implement the duty to consult, certain elements of the EA process that are 
more consistent with a transformational function can be identified. First, the 
requirement for alternatives should be applied with full rigour. The requirement 
to assess alternatives will be relevant at both the scoping and decision stages of 
EA. At the scoping stage, the determination of which issues are to be assessed and 
the depth of assessment will need to account for preferred Aboriginal alternatives. 
At the decision stage, where alternatives have been considered, the reasons given 
will need to respond to the preferred Aboriginal alternatives and provide, where 
appropriate, a justification for the rejection of those alternatives.
In the absence of standards that address themselves to acceptable levels 
of interference with Aboriginal interests, requiring the careful examination of 
preferred Aboriginal alternatives requires the Crown to address itself to the 
question of whether the same public objective can be achieved in a manner that 
is less likely to infringe Aboriginal interests. This would require in circumstances 
of deep consultation, not only a consideration of “alternative means of carrying 
out the designated project,”204 but also “alternatives to the project.”205 The former 
accepts uncritically the need for the project and that the identified project is the 
preferred manner by which the underlying public objective is achieved, while 
the latter gives a more fulsome voice to Aboriginal viewpoints on development 
visions that impact their interests. From a justificatory standpoint, requiring the 
Crown to consider alternatives promotes a dialogue over competing development 
visions, but also requires the Crown to articulate in terms that address themselves 
to Aboriginal interests why the Crown’s development approach is preferred. 
Examining the need for the project requires justification of the Crown’s objective. 
This is not to suggest that the objective has to meet the “compelling and 
substantial” requirement in the Sparrow test,206 but where the strength of claim 
merits deep consultation, the reconciliation goal that underlies the requirement 
to show that the Crown’s objectives are of compelling and substantial importance 
remains relevant.207 Alternatives analysis also captures the minimal infringement 
requirement by raising a burden of justification on the Crown to demonstrate 
why a less harmful (to Aboriginal interests) alternative is not preferred.208 
204. CEAA, supra note 2, s 19(1)(g).
205. CEAA, 1992, supra note 109, s 16.
206. Supra note 19 at 1113.
207. Gladstone, supra note 71 at para 73.
208. R v Nikal, 1996 SCC 245 at para 110, [1996] 1 SCR 1013.
CRAIK,  PROCESS AND RECONCILIATION 676
A second element to which greater attention is required to be paid relates to 
the question of cumulative effects. The diminishment of Aboriginal rights and 
interests over time and with each new development proposal is a central source 
of Aboriginal frustration.209 As described above, the courts have been sensitive to 
the issue of cumulative impacts on asserted Aboriginal rights, but project-based 
assessment presents some limitations in the consideration of cumulative impacts 
over large areas and time scales.210 The judicial recognition of the significance 
of cumulative impacts militates in favour of a more strategic approach to 
assessment, which would consider cumulative impacts on a regional scale. 
Picking up on the discussion of alternatives, SEA allows for consultation at early 
stages of development planning processes, providing for greater opportunities 
for articulation of shared development priorities and expectations in advance of 
specific project proposals. Other strategic tools beyond the assessment of policies, 
plans, and programs (the typical domain of SEA), such as regional cumulative 
impact studies and scenario building, can usefully contribute to properly 
understanding the long-term implications of sustained resource development on 
Aboriginal interests.
There has been broad judicial recognition of the obligation to consult at 
strategic levels where decision-making processes are engaged, but this right 
does not obligate the Crown to conduct strategic-level EAs where they do not 
exist.211 It does, however, require some vigilance on the part of the Crown and 
the courts to recognize where policy-level decisions can lead to adverse Aboriginal 
impacts. In such cases, the Crown will have to assess whether a legal obligation 
to consult exists.212 In doing so, the Crown needs to be sensitive to the long-term 
implications on the exercise of Aboriginal rights associated with cumulative 
impacts. The Gitxaala test requiring consultation where a process creates “clear 
momentum” that forecloses future policy options has some application here, 
suggesting consultation obligations where strategic policy decisions advance 
development opportunities.213 Viewed in isolation, the impacts may suggest that 
the duty to consult be considered at the low end, but understood in a more 
209. Blueberry, supra note 137; Lameman v Alberta, 2013 ABCA 148, 85 Alta LR (5th) 64 
(deciding on a breach of treaty rights claim based on cumulative impacts of development); 
Mark Haddock, Environmental Assessment in British Columbia (Victoria: Environmental Law 
Centre, 2010) at 72-73.
210. Gibson, et al, “Strengthening SEA,” supra note 116 at 192.
211. Ibid.
212. Courtoreille v Canada, 2014 FC 1244, 248 ACWS (3d) 491 (finding a duty to consult in 
relation to federal legislation).
213. Gitxaala, supra note 119 at para 40. 
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holistic fashion, the duty may be viewed as requiring a more discursive process. 
Sensitivity to the implications of government policy for future resource impacts 
and their consequent affect on Aboriginal interests was recognized in Ross River 
Dena Council v Government of Yukon,214 which involved the granting of exploration 
rights under the Yukon’s Quartz Mining Act. In that case, the Yukon Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the requirements to implement the duty to consult 
are flexible.215 Critically, the court also noted that where “serious and long-lasting 
adverse effects” are present, “[t]he Crown must ensure that it maintains the ability 
to prevent or regulate activities where it is appropriate to do so.”216
Providing for strategic-level EA advances a more transformative approach 
to EA in that SEA processes encourage an information rich and participatory 
decision-making environment at the policy level. Giving Aboriginal groups an 
opportunity to shape policy and programmatic-level decisions that will then shape 
project-level decisions, including shaping the availability or at least feasibility of 
alternative development tracks, provides an opportunity for the development of a 
common set of normative arrangements that will govern future decision making. 
Such an approach is consistent with the approach by the courts to require 
consultation throughout the decision-making process. Insisting on strategic-level 
assessment has both procedural benefits and substantive norm-creating benefits. 
The use of SEA is consistent with federal, and to some degree, provincial, EA 
policy.217 The federal government has a SEA directive,218 and the purpose section 
and sections 73-74 of the CEAA expressly provide for “the study of cumulative 
effects of physical activities in a region and the consideration of those study 
results in environmental assessments.”219
One of the reasons that cumulative effects arise is that decisions under EA 
processes accept that projects will result in a harm to the environment and to 
Aboriginal interests, but that these harms are either insignificant or justifiably traded 
214. 2012 YKCA 14, 358 DLR (4th) 100.
215. Ibid at para 45.
216. Ibid at para 51.
217. The Environment Act, CCSM 2015, c E125, s 12.0.1; Government of Saskatchewan, 
“First Nation and Métis Consultation Policy Framework” (June 2010), online: 
<www.saskatchewan.ca/~/media/files/government%20relations/first%20nations/
consultation%20policy%20framework.pdf>; Environmental Protection and Enhancement Act, 
RSA 2000, c E-12, s 39(e).
218. Government of Canada Privy Counsel Office, “Strategic Environmental Assessment: The 
Cabinet Directive on the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals” 
(May 2012), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=b3186435-1>.
219. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4(1)(i). This section is implemented through sections 73-74, although 
to date has not been acted upon.
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off against other public goals. The central evaluative measure for acceptability of 
impacts is the minimization of adverse impacts or the avoidance of “irreversible” 
harm.220 In these circumstances, small and diffuse but acceptable harms may 
contribute to a broader erosion of Aboriginal interests, particularly where those 
interests are understood, as they properly should be, in intergenerational terms. 
From a reconciliatory standpoint, mitigation alone may offer little positive 
benefit to Aboriginal communities. Impact and benefit agreements (IBA) provide 
one avenue for ensuring Aboriginal participation in the economic benefits from 
development, but the IBA process is a private negotiation conducted outside the 
EIA process. A further option is to require projects to adhere to a more sustainably 
oriented outcome that requires the project to identify positive contributions to 
environmental and social outcomes from the project, referred to as sustainability 
assessment.221 Gibson has noted that, on occasion, Canadian EA processes have 
sought to incorporate this “higher standard” by requiring the proponent to 
include in its EA documentation a discussion of the “positive overall contribution 
towards the attainment of ecological and community sustainability, both at the 
local and regional levels.”222 Such a reorientation, which is entirely consistent 
with the objectives of EA legislation,223 moves away from viewing trade-offs as 
a balancing of competing interests, towards a more integrative approach, which 
looks at the long-term sustainable future of the impacted community.224 While 
reconciliation itself is often described in oppositional terms (i.e., as balancing 
Aboriginal interests with those of non-Aboriginals), the critical opportunity 
that the integrative orientation of sustainability assessment provides is the 
220. Gibson, “Contribution to Sustainability,” supra note 37. Gibson quotes from 
Red Hill Expressway Review Panel, “Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 
Guidelines for the Review of the Proposed Red Hill Creek Expressway North-South 
Section Project” (August 1999), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.
asp?lang=En&xml=b2ffe120-9921-4e27-b28f-521f5245f7b9#archived>.
221. Robert Gibson et al, eds, Sustainability Assessment: Criteria, Processes, and Application 
(Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005).
222. Gibson, “Contribution to Sustainability,” supra note 37. Gibson quotes from Red Hill 
Expressway Review Panel, “Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Guidelines for the 
Review of the Proposed Red Hill Creek Expressway North-South Section Project” (August 
1999), online: <http://www.ceaa.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&xml=b2ffe120-9921-4e27-b28f-
521f5245f7b9#archived>, noting Labrador Inuit Association v Newfoundland (Minister of 
Environment and Labour), [1997] NJ No 201, 1997 No 124 as another example.
223. CEAA, supra note 2, s 4.
224. Gibson, “Contribution to Sustainability,” supra note 37.
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opportunity for the Crown and Aboriginal groups to deliberate over a shared 
development vision.225
IV. CONCLUSION
The promise of transformational approaches is that over time, as actors with 
diverse interests confront those differences on the basis of reciprocal justifications, 
the politics engaged in is characterized by a more reasoned and less adversarial 
discourse.226 Whether EA has resulted in the internalization of environmental 
values within systems of government decision making remains a controverted 
matter. For his part, Joseph Sax reconsidered his skepticism regarding NEPA, 
conceding that he “underestimated the influence of NEPA’s ‘soft law’ elements.”227 
Several empirical assessments of the long-term impacts of EA have concluded 
that EA does contribute to positive environmental outcomes and to the broader 
process of norm internalization.228 There is, to be clear, nothing inevitable about 
transformational approaches to EA. As Doelle229 and Gibson230 have argued in 
relation to the revised structure of the CEAA, governments can move to restrict 
the application of EA and insert more administrative discretion that serves to 
decouple EA from its substantive environmental objectives. The intertwining of 
225. Potes, supra note 198 at 38, citing Arthur Pape, “Honour of the Crown. New Constitutional 
Duty to Protect Aboriginal Rights. A Consideration of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
decisions in the Haida Nation and Taku River Tlingit Frist Ntion cases,” (Paper delivered 
at the Conference on the Impact of the Haida and Taku River Decision: Consultation and 
Accomodation with First Nations, 26-27 January 2005), [unpublished]. Potes indicates that 
the promotion of sustainability in respect of lands and resources relied on by Aboriginal 
groups is a central to the purpose of accommodation.
226. Richard F Devlin & Ronalda Murphy, “Contextualizing the Duty to Consult: 
Clarification or Transformation?” (2003) 14 NJCL 167 at 214. Devlin and Murphy note 
that the duty to consult “create[s] incentives for the relevant actors to see each other in 
non-adversarial terms.”
227. Joseph Sax, “Introduction” (1986) 19:4 U Mich JL Ref 797 at 804, n 28. 
228. Canadian Environmental Assessment Agency, Environmental Assessment in a Changing 
World: Final Report of the Study of the Effectiveness of Environmental Assessment, by Barry 
Sadler (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1996); Council on Environmental 
Quality, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of Effectiveness After Twenty-five Years 
(Washington, DC: Council on Environmental Quality, 1997). See also Taylor, supra note 43; 
Craik, supra note 43.
229. Supra note 149.
230. Robert Gibson, “In Full Retreat: The Canadian Government’s New Environmental 
Assessment Law Undoes Decades of Progress” (2012) 30:3 Impact Assessment & 
Project Appraisal 179.
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the duty to consult with EA provides an important countervailing force to the 
retrenchment of the robust environmental aspirations of EA.
In this article, I have sought to take stock of the implementation of the duty 
to consult through EA processes. Here I have argued that EA and the duty to 
consult are to a significant degree bound together. Consequently, my intent was 
not to demonstrate whether the use of EA to implement the duty to consult is 
a sound policy choice, but given their necessary interrelationship, I have sought 
to show that careful attention needs to be paid to the constitutional dimension 
of the duty to consult along all stages of the EA process. At the heart of the duty 
to consult is the stringent demand for meaningful consultation—a requirement 
that cannot be neatly separated from the duty to accommodate. This, I argue, 
pushes EA towards its more deliberative and justificatory construction. 
None of the normative arguments I make regarding the form of EA require 
a radical departure from its current function and structure. In each instance, the 
Crown has the discretion to structure EA processes in ways that emphasize its 
transformative potential. The constitutional nature of the duty to consult ought 
to influence the exercise of that discretion in ways that are consistent with the goal 
of reconciliation which, at a minimum, requires the justification of government 
decisions in ways that account for Aboriginal interests and perspectives, and 
provide a substantive basis for Aboriginal acceptance of the decisions made.
The argument presented here does not seek to impose a formally substantive 
rationality on decisions affecting Aboriginal interests. Rather, I view both EA and 
the duty to consult as forms of proceduralized obligations, whereby the process 
and substance are themselves deeply intertwined. Proceduralization respects 
the political content of the choices being made. In this regard, I argue that the 
SCC’s approach in refraining from giving substantive content to the duty to 
accommodate is sound, so long as it is accompanied by a robust understanding 
of the potential of process to transform legal relationships, as well as the stringent 
requirements that are necessary to realize that potential.
